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ABSTRACT

This paper investigates Herman Melville’s quest for spiritual stability
and certainty in his novel Moby-Dick. The analysis establishes a
philosophical tradition of doubt towards the Bible, outlining the philosophies
of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza, David Hume, Thomas Paine and
John Henry Newman. This historical survey of spiritual uncertainty
establishes the issue of uncertainty that Melville writes about in the
nineteenth century. Having assessed the issue of doubt, I then analyze
Melville’s use of metaphorical charts, which his characters use to resolve
this issue. Finally, I present Melville’s philosophical findings as he
expresses them through the metaphor of whaling. Here, I also scrutinize
Melville’s depiction of nature, as well as his presentation of the dichotomy
between contemplative and active questing, as represented by the characters
Ishmael and Ahab.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades scholars have been particularly concerned with
theological themes in Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick. The interpretations of Melville’s
religious allusions have been as multifaceted as the crew’s interpretations of the doubloon
in the novel. However, none of these approaches deals with Melville’s inquiry of spiritual
uncertainty in the novel.
For instance, Thomas Vargish claims in his essay “Gnostic Mythos in MobyDick” (1966) that Melville distinguishes between the inferior creator god of the physical
world (Demiurgus) and the spiritual realm (Pleroma) in his theological system.
According to Vargish, Melville’s cognizance of this Gnostic dualism allows him to depict
God as “an inferior and imperfect” and therefore assailable creator in the form of the
white whale (273). Thus Vargish delivers an Arminian1 reading, claiming that man is not
entirely dependent on God. Three years later, Walter Herbert claims more pessimistically
in “Calvinism and Cosmic Evil in Moby-Dick” (1969) that Melville did not have a
specific religious agenda, but rather tried to display “an actual cosmic evil which
challenges the validity of Christian theology altogether” (1619). Herbert is especially
interested in the idea of Ahab’s “maddened madness” as an expression of individual

1

“Arminius, Jacobus. 1560–1609, Dutch Reformed theologian, whose original name was
Jacob Harmensen. He studied at Leiden, Marburg, Geneva, and Basel and in 1588
became a pastor at Amsterdam. […] He was professor of theology at the Univ. of Leiden
after 1603, and he engaged in violent theological debates, seeking to win the Dutch
Reformed Church to his views. His teaching, known as Arminianism, […] asserted the
compatibility of divine sovereignty with human freedom, denied John Calvin’s doctrine
of irresistible grace, and thus modified the strict conception of predestination.” (“Jacobus
Arminius”).
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“defiance against the monster God,” which is still in keeping with Vargish’s Arminian
reading (1618, 19). In the same year, Helen Trimpi surveys the individual characters and
their connection to the topic of diabolic possession, as she explores "Melville’s Use of
Demonology and Witchcraft in Moby-Dick." In contrast, Mark Lloyd Taylor rather
traditionally considers Melville’s Christian allusions in his essay “Ishmael's (m)Other:
Gender, Jesus, and God in Melville's Moby-Dick” (1992). Taylor suggests that Ishmael
embodies Christlike character trades of compassion, passiveness, and feminine love.
Therefore, Taylor argues that Ishmael contrasts “associations of God, power, and
masculinity” employed by Melville in his description of nature’s cannibalistic character
(Taylor 349). A decade later, popular journal author Gary Sloan evokes Herbert’s notion
of the Calvinist “God-bully” in his short essay “Moby Dick: Broiled in Hellfire” (2002),
claiming that Ahab’s monomaniac quest is Melville’s coping with the early death of his
father and his childhood (62). This cycle—and recycling—of religious analyses
culminates in most recent collection of religious elements in Melville’s writings by Gail
Coffler in her book Melville's Allusions to Religion: A Comprehensive Index and
Glossary (2004).
As my survey demonstrates, religious motifs inhabit a prominent role in the
critical discourse about Moby-Dick. However, none of these critics considers Melville’s
underlying task of arriving at some kind of spiritual certainty—be it Christian or
mystic—in the novel. The quest for spiritual certainty, as I will propose it in this paper,
therefore has not been explored fully in the critical history of the text. As a matter of fact,
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the questing component of Melville’s search for certainty has received more critical
attention than the problem of uncertainty itself.
In an early analysis of questing in Moby-Dick Beongcheon Yu suggests the
dichotomy between Ahab and Ishmael’s modes of questing in his essay “Ishmael’s Equal
Eye: The Source of Balance in Moby-Dick” (1965). In fact Yu claims that “Ahab pursues
while Ishmael quests” (118). This creates a continuum of obsession and fascination
between the two characters. If the whale stands for God, Ishmael turns away in respect
(like Moses) while Ahab has to step closer to get on eye-level and ultimately gets
destroyed.
Carl Vaught expands this concept in his perceptive essay “Religion as a Quest for
Wholeness: Melville’s Moby-Dick” (1974), when he notes that Ahab, Ishmael, and
Queequeg attempt to attain stability by hunting whales, which Vaught sees as keepers of
the mystery of the ocean and thus of the mystery of the person reflected by the water. For
instance, Vaught claims that the white whale primarily fascinates Ahab because it
represents a “symbol of the eternal dimension of himself” (19). Consequently, Vaught
assigns different modes of questing to each of the three characters: Queequeg poses as
consistency personified because he stoically awaits his death, while Ahab represents
questing by all means (negative quest), and Ishmael embodies observation and rebirth
(positive quest). Nevertheless, Vaught fails to address the exact process by which
Melville has these characters quest for stability, i.e. certainty.
Ten years later Bruce Grenberg surveys Melville’s earlier and later works, while
postulating the existence of a universal truth at which Melville tries to arrive through
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questing in Some Other World to Find (1989). Although hidden in the deep of the ocean,
Grenberg claims rather simplistically that truth can indeed be unraveled and is actually
obtainable by Melville’s characters. At the same time, Grenberg acknowledges the
complex multiplicity of human perspectives, as well as the methodological dichotomy of
Ahab and Ishmael’s quests.
Towards the end of the twentieth century, Eliza New seizes on Vaught and
Grenberg’s suggestion of the different representations of questing in Melville’s characters
in her essay “Bible Leaves! Bible Leaves! Hellenism and Hebraism in Melville’s MobyDick” (1998). New vividly illustrates the pressing issue of “unification of the disjointed
scripture” in the nineteenth century by assessing Ishmael and Ahab as representatives of
opposed textual principles (288). However, she also reintroduces Yu’s concept of
Ishmael as a passive quester who is respectful to nature and its boundaries as the primary
reason for his survival.
As these previous surveys of theology and questing show, Herman Melville
describes both a literal and spiritual quest for certainty in Moby-Dick. The crew of the
Pequod utilizes various means by which they make sense of their environment, evaluate
the world within their own religious system (Queequeg), and analyze their encounters
with the divinity in nature, as Melville illustrates the dichotomy of unprecedented
economic expansion and decreasing grounds for spirituality that American society faces
in the wake of the Enlightenment.
Moby-Dick thus accurately displays the public mindset of Melville’s age. Melville
appears to stay true to Emerson’s comment that “the temper of the age becomes a cultural
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determinant of the themes and style of great literature” (qtd. in Reynolds 5). The plot
poses as a metaphor for the author’s own quest for religious certainty and mysticism in an
age dominated by reason. Melville toys with man’s search for an anthropomorphic God
in an unrelenting struggle with nature. To put it quite simply, Melville poses several
questions: Is human perception capable of attaining true insight into the nature of God? Is
God synonymous with nature, or does he weave—to borrow from Goethe’s Faust—the
fabric of the universe from a realm beyond physical reality and operate in the world by
means of agents? Seeing that nature is depicted as being treacherous and violent; is man
faced with a malignant or a benign God? And if God is nature, can he indeed be tamed
and be made assailable by hunting and taming the whale?
In my analysis, I will show how Melville negotiates his own quest through his
characters. The verb “negotiate” here illustrates the nature of the discourse—both
Melville’s and the reader’s—as the author addresses questions that obviously cannot be
answered with decisive closure. The act of addressing them remains a continuous process
of negotiation through time. If nothing else, Melville’s discourse exhibits the questions
and the rationalist tools with which the citizens of Post-Enlightenment society negotiate
their reality, as well as the mindset of an age in which it became increasingly hard for the
author to simply believe.
To assess the zeitgeist of Melville’s age, I will use Herbert Hovenkamp’s Science
and Religion in America 1800-1860, a study that illustrates the debate surrounding natural
theology and science in the wake of the Age of Enlightenment. At the beginning of the
eighteenth century, it was still assumed that “Scriptures contained a set of facts in exactly
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the same way that nature contained facts”; accordingly “science and theology were
merely two different ways of coming to know and appreciate God” (11, 16). My
discussion of Enlightenment pyrrhonism includes an examination of Thomas Hobbes’s
Leviathan, Benedict de Spinoza’s A Theologico-Political Treatise, David Hume’s Essay
“On Miracles,” Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason, and John Henry Newman’s Fifteen
Sermons preached before the University of Oxford between A.D. 1826 and 1843.
Although there is no explicit empirical evidence that Melville read all or any of
the above-mentioned sources, I will demonstrate that the texts drawn on in my first
chapter capture the spiritual and philosophical zeitgeist in which Melville wrote MobyDick. Establishing the fact that no author writes in an intellectual vacuum, I will set the
stage for the analysis of Melville’s quest for religious certainty in an age in which the
spiritual values of society were renegotiated.
After sketching the theoretical foundations that shape the American Renaissance,
I will continue to examine Melville’s quest for certainty in various aspects of his
characters’ with nature. The chapter “The Doubloon” will play a central role here, as it
demonstrates Melville’s coping with subjectivity and his deconstruction of reality.
Melville utilizes various forms and representations of charts in the text by which the
characters try to negotiate their role in Providence or even attempt to map the nature of
God. Charts appear in various forms, from physical charts—such as the ones Ahab uses
to track the whale—to metaphysical charts, such as Queequeg’s tattoos. I will survey the
various representations of charts and how the characters use them as rational anchors of
spiritual certainty.
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Nature functions as another factor of spiritual disruption in Moby-Dick. The
various representations of nature—e.g. the ocean and the whale(s)—command
tremendous power but also appear treacherous and deceitful. I will examine the recurring
motif of the “pasteboard mask” of God, i.e. the pairing of surface and deep-structure of
reality, as it occurs on multiple levels in the plot (Melville 140). Accordingly, it should be
kept in mind that the dichotomy between a beautiful appearance and the unrelenting
violent force that lurks behind it ultimately mark the defining character trait of the white
whale itself. The dichotomy between the surface and the deep-structure leads Melville to
explore the reality of human nature, as well as the nature of nature through the metaphor
of whaling. Thus the uncertainty evoked by the ideological concept of the “pasteboard
mask” inhabits a central role in the author’s quest for certainty and therefore in my
analysis.
The physical dissection of whales will be another aspect of the text covered by my
analysis. Melville’s cetology chapters not only provide practical knowledge and
handbook terminology about whaling, but also demonstrate the method by which the
Leviathan can be measured and analyzed. I will use the chapters “A Bower in the
Arsacides” and “Jonah Historically Regarded” to demonstrate this notion.
However, the most essential question to be addressed in this analysis of MobyDick is whether Melville actually provides closure to his quest of uncertainty. The
objective of my analysis is not to demonstrate the sources that Melville drew on for his
work, but to illustrate how perceptively he debates the spiritual meltdown that his
generation faced. The disconcerting idea that all truths are subject to negotiation marks
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the Enlightenment as the touchstone age for scientific exploration. However, this idea by
no means eliminates the human need for complete reliance on unalterable truths, but
rather makes the search and the justification of any findings more complex. Writers of the
American Renaissance such as Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David Thoreau continue
to address these topics and drift towards a new notion of “connectedness” of all beings
(compare Emerson’s Over Soul in his essay on nature).
Consequently, I argue that Melville performs a negotiation of faith that continues
in our own age. Can God and nature be trustworthy? Can the human existential quest for
faith be trustworthy, or is it merely a crutch to reconcile one’s belief in a benign God with
the reality of the unsympathetic force of nature, and a deterministic God who has
abandoned us to the cold mediation of his divine machine? In all of this, Melville tries to
gain certainty about the relation of man’s internal perception with a supposedly superior
moral principle that exists independently and outside of itself. This principle may carry
various names (nature, fate, God, or chance), but ultimately the answer to Melville’s
inquiry seems to be implied in the question itself. He wants to find certainty, meaningful
proof for man’s connection with something, anything, that surpasses him in his
comprehension of existence.
To illustrate Melville’s quest for certainty, I will begin my analysis with assessing
the zeitgeist, as well as the philosophical tradition of doubt that Melville was writing in.
This initial survey will give us an understanding of how Melville perceived the issue of
uncertainty in his own age. Having assessed the problem of uncertainty, I will proceed to
show how Melville uses charts in order to resolve it. In a final step, I plan to show how
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Melville presents the philosophical findings of his quest to the reader by means of his
whaling metaphor.
As I have said in my survey of the existing body of literature on the topic, I do not
intend simply to account for Melville’s incorporation of Bible passages and JudeoChristian symbols in Moby-Dick. My aim is to demonstrate Melville’s use of the text as a
tool in his own spiritual quest for certainty and to show what, if anything, this inquiry
brings forth. Throughout his professional career, Melville tried to balance the conflict
between writing popular literature to make a living and communicating his philosophical
knowledge to create a monumental work. He loathed the fact that he had to comply with
popular demands and economic constraints in his profession. Through Moby-Dick
Melville seeks to transcend popular literature and enter into the realm of philosophic
inquiry. For Melville then, Moby-Dick was more than just another novel; it was more
than “the culmination of Melville’s early permutations of the dark reform mode”
(Reynolds 152); it was his finest attempt yet to explore his own need for certainty at a
time when the concept itself seemed hopelessly lost in his eternal “If” (Melville 373).
Finally, I want to establish that Melville’s negotiation of certainty is both a timely
expression of his zeitgeist and a psychological endeavor to regain his mental stability.
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II. THE ISSUE OF DOUBT AND THE LOSS OF FAITH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

“Controversy, at least in this age, does not lie between the hosts of heaven […]
and the powers of evil […]; but it is a sort of night battle, where each fights for himself,
and friends and foe stand together. When men understand what each other mean, they see
[…] that controversy is either superfluous or hopeless.” (201)
- John Henry Newman, Fifteen Sermons.

The age in which Herman Melville was writing was marked by fundamental
changes in both Christian faith and the natural science. I have principally relied on
Herbert Hovenkamp’s Science and Religion in America 1800-1860 as a proverbial chart
through the voluminous discourses of the time period in question. Hovenkamp provides a
thorough discussion of the strongly contested issues of genealogy, geology, and textual
criticism on the Bible in the nineteenth century, and manages to turn the renegotiation of
ground between religion, philosophy and science into a fascinating narrative.
Hovenkamp illustrates the struggle natural theology—science that proves biblical
accounts—faces, as it tries to make finite statements about God and his perpetual
influence on the universe. The author identifies an increased need to explain God
amongst discerning minds of the nineteenth century, a need that is expressed by the rise
of German Higher Criticism. Higher criticism, as Hovenkamp notes, questioned the
formerly predominant orthodox assumption that “truth stands still,” and debauched
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conservatives to claim, that “the Bible must be its own final authority” (61, 62). Higher
criticism thus challenged many traditional categories of truth associated with scripture.
For instance, the term “history,” as a linear process that consolidates thought and action
to biblical science.
This new current in natural theology promoted the assumption that all of creation
is based on the rational thought process of God.2 Eventually, the notion of constructed
history drove orthodox observers like Horatio Black Hackett, a professor at Newton
Seminar, to the observation that “all history loses its certainty” if this deconstructive
method is applied (Hackett in Hovenkamp 74). Still, “Americans wanted to know what
they believed” 3 and thus “orthodoxy and literalism would always appear to be straighter
answers than higher criticism and mythology” (Hovenkamp 78).
As Hovenkamp notes, the theological debate ultimately became a discussion
about whether science could “describe the laws of nature” in a way that did not violate
biblical history (94). Catastrophists, who sought to reconcile science and religion and
Uniformitarians, who pleaded for complete separation of the two disciplines opposed
each other in this discussion. Ideologically, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had
been marked with a fascination of the scientific field of mechanics. For example,
Calvinism suggested a concept of the universe as gigantic unalterable clockwork. In the
nineteenth century this perception changed and an organic model of the cosmos became
popular. The organism still followed natural laws but could also change and adapt. These

2

This ideology led David Friedrich Strauss to publish Das Leben Jesu (1835) in which he
pits empirical historicity against scriptural mythology.
3
Hovenkamp’s italics.
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assumptions made it possible for scientists to refer to natural developments in geology,
genealogy4 and paleontology without having to refer to God directly.
At this point, the era of metaphysical mathematics began. Empiricists believed
that creation in its entirety could be deciphered by a “mathematical key to the universe”
(Hovenkamp 104). The “Law of Unity” of God and creation, deducted from Maquis de
Laplace’s Celestial Mechanics (Traité dé Mécanique Céleste, 1800-05), seemingly
provided “proof of a thoughtful and purposeful creation by a wise and moral God”
(Hovenkamp 104). This school of idealism restored the belief in the complete
predictability of nature and God.
However, the idealism of the laws of unity and succession would spread out to
various other scientific fields. For instance, geologists attempted to account for the
history of the earth without referencing supernaturalism, which rendered miracles like
“the deluge” increasingly hard to prove. Meanwhile, on the conservative side, advocates
of the “long day theory” maintained the accuracy of the biblical creation account, but
granted variations for the length of the time period of occurrences like the deluge and the
creation of the earth (Hovenkamp 127).
Another separate but related key issue was the debate about the unity of man.
Science found itself faced with the problem of demonstrating the direct lineage of Adam
and Eve down to modern human beings to support the biblical account. For, as

4

For example, Francis Wayland suggests in The Elements of Moral Science (1831) that
knowledge of “succession ‘forms the first conception of a law of nature’” (Hovenkamp
100). Since nature represents the concept of one divine mind, all of its parts are
connected. According to these “laws of succession,” the “blanks” in scientific knowledge
can be “filled in” by association (Hovenkamp 101, 102).
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Hovenkamp notes, only if Adam and Eve could bring sin into the world, then Jesus Christ
could take it away, since he is “of ‘one blood’ with Adam” (173). Thus natural theology
had to account not only for the unity of mankind as a race, 5 but also for the possibility of
salvation. The empirical truthfulness of original sin would cement the necessity of a
savior, as well as the authenticity of the deluge and therefore of scripture.6 Being unable
to reconcile the fundamental issue of species with scripture, science created an additional
dimension of insecurity. With Darwinism rising in the middle of the century, orthodox
commentators, like Matthew Boyd Hope (1850), suggested that if the Bible explicitly
addresses any given subject, literal scripture should be considered the final scientific
authority on the matter. Only in those cases where the Bible “touches ‘incidentally’ on a
scientific question” it leaves room for interpretation and the acknowledgement of nonscriptural sources (Hope qtd. in Hovenkamp 169). Orthodox scientists perceived this as a
final attempt at reconciliation; an attempt that ultimately acknowledged that natural
theology had failed. As Hovenkamp notes, representatives of both sides of the discussion
realized that “true religious commitment requires a leap of faith” (213).
Having outlined the main issues in the philosophical debate of the nineteenth
century, I will now focus on the discourse that provided the theoretical background for
Melville’s assessment of man’s hunt for the leviathan. To achieve this goal, I will

5

Samuel George Morton initiates the polygenesis controversy with his study Crania
Americana (1839), insinuating that God had made “multiple creations” and had shaped
different peoples (Africans, Caucasians) according to their environment (Morton in
Hovenkamp 172). This hypothesis was strongly contested, as orthodox interpreters, for
example, associated the dark skin pigmentation with the Curse of Cain in the story of
Noah and thus claimed the unity of race as proof for both original sin and deluge.
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demonstrate the philosophical bearings that the works of such as Thomas Hobbes’s
Leviathan (1651), Benedict de Spinoza’s A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political
Treatise (1670), David Hume’s An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding
(1748), Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason (1795), and John Henry Newman’s Fifteen
Sermons (1872) had on the zeitgeist of the nineteenth century and how their revolutionary
challenges to the Bible are reflected in Melville’s quest for certainty.

The ideas

advocated by these critics prove essential to the philosophical and intellectual zeitgeist of
Melville’s day.
As Hovenkamp demonstrates, the debates about the reliability of the Bible during
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were as groundbreaking as they were
numerous. Any and all of these debates, as I will argue, create an atmosphere of spiritual
doubt that Melville discusses in Moby-Dick. Therefore, in the first step of my analysis, I
will present central spiritual issues such as the reliability of the senses, the reliability of
human testimony, the certainty of miracles, and scriptural authority, as they are
established by the aforementioned critics to establish the philosophical groundwork for
my discussion of Melville’s quest for uncertainty. Ultimately understanding the historical
debate surrounding these issues of certainty will help us determine whether Ahab and his
crew perceive nature as a panentheistic7 God recognizable in the whale, or as a

7

Panentheism is “the theory or belief that God encompasses and interpenetrates the
universe but at the same time is greater than and independent of it. Freq. contrasted with
pantheism” (Oxford English Dictionary).
In contrast, pantheism “A belief or philosophical theory that God is immanent in or
identical with the universe; the doctrine that God is everything and everything is God.
freq. with implications of nature worship or (in a weakened sense) love of nature”
(Oxford English Dictionary).
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malignant, intangible, deterministic, and impersonal God, whose mechanistic laws
indifferently crush both the large and the small. Accordingly, the topics mentioned above
establish the themes developed in Melville’s greatest work.
This survey of the philosophic debate about doubt will demonstrate that Melville
wrote in an age ideologically marked by transition from biblical science, which strove to
validate the literal accounts of scripture, to secularized empirical investigation. As David
Reynolds notes, Moby-Dick represents the “culmination of Melville’s early permutations
of the dark-reform mode,” but more importantly, as I find, the novel addresses the
spiritual anxiety of Melville’s day and suggests solutions to this anxiety (Reynolds 152). I
will argue that Melville’s attempt at reform is constructive rather than merely subversive
because it focuses on the epistemological question of attaining spiritual certainty in a
world increasingly dominated by religious doubt.
Furthermore, this chapter will illustrate the fundamental problem of a changed
standard for truth that was created by a school of scriptural criticism initiated by Thomas
Hobbes with the publication of his Leviathan in 1651. For instance, Hobbes asks how we
can be sure about the truths we find in Scripture if we cannot even be sure about the
information our senses give us. Almost three hundred years later, Melville is faced with
the same dilemma, including one significant new development that heightened the
volatile nature of the issue of certainty: The rise of modern science had increasingly
alienated believers from their time-honored creeds. By the time Melville published MobyDick it seemed as if society, and American society in particular, could no longer blindly
believe in religion, Scripture, and God because it had developed a reverence for empirical
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methodology. Thus discerning minds in the nineteenth century required evidence for
spiritual axioms that had to be of the same category as empirical knowledge, even as they
displayed the same psychological craving for faith demanded in previous centuries.
Melville is cognizant of this dilemma because he experiences it himself. In fact, I argue
that the ideological basis for Moby-Dick is an inextinguishable but sadly unquenchable
thirst for faith.
For these reasons, I shall demonstrate how the zeitgeist of spiritual disorientation
of Melville’s age originate from a philosophical tradition of pyrrhonism that can be
traced back several hundred years, and how Melville processes previous philosophical
discussions of uncertainty in an artistic manner in the nineteenth century. Although
Merton Sealts notes in his work Melville’s Reading (1988) that a list of Melville’s
complete library has not yet been compiled and that “it seems likely that additional
volumes {…}5 will continue to turn up in years to come” (13). I argue that Melville had
absorbed the philosophic content of the works by Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Paine, and
Newman, even if he never read any of their works first hand. Sealts notes, quoting
Harrison Hayford and Walter Blair, that “Melville ‘often put into the manuscripts he was
working on some sort of predated reference to books that were currently interesting to
him’”; however, Sealts acknowledges that there is currently no data on how extensive
Melville’s reading of Hobbes, Spinoza, etc. was because Sealts does not include these
authors (with the exception of Hobbes) into his listing of Melville’s personal library
(Sealts, Reading 25). By the time Sealts published his study, he lists 269 “titles
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surviving,” and 232 “located” in Melville’s library (13).8 Though far from identifying
specific works that should be added to Sealts’s list, my analysis focuses on Melville’s
assessment of his zeitgeist, while providing a selective overview over the history of
uncertainty in the Enlightenment tradition of philosophy.

The Reliability of the Senses
A fundamental question in Melville’s quest for certainty is whether the tools we
use in order to gain certainty are reliable. Melville is aware that we rely on the faculty of
our senses to attain information about the world around us. At the same time, Melville is
fully cognizant about the unreliability of this information. The quest for certainty
therefore inevitably involves the reliability of our senses. If sensory perception can help
us understand nature, then we can gather knowledge about God by scrutinizing nature.9
Unfortunately, Melville does not share this optimistic view of the senses because he
repeatedly shows how they can be deceived. For example, when Ishmael first encounters
Queequeg in the Spouter-Inn bedroom he is horrified by the outlandish tattoos of his
“terrible bedfellow” (Melville 33). Shortly after he first encounters Queequeg, Ishmael
calms himself by thinking “it’s only his outside; a man can be honest in any sort of skin”
(Melville 34). In this particular instance, Melville demonstrates how Ishmael realizes that
8

The sources I introduce have also not appeared in Olsen-Smith and Sealts’s recent
article “A Cumulative Supplement to Melville's Reading” (2004) an article that expands
the library list Sealts provides in Melville’s Reading. For details see Olsen-Smith, Steven
and Merton M. Sealts Jr. “A Cumulative Supplement to Melville's Reading.” Leviathan:
A Journal of Melville Studies 6.1 (2004): 55-77.
9
See Ralph Waldo Emerson’s panentheistic rendering of nature in his essay “The OverSoul” (written in 1847) where Emerson declares that there is no “wall in the soul where
man, the effect, ceases, and God, the cause, begins” (Emerson 165).
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Queequeg’s appearance does not necessarily reflect his character.10 Even though Ishmael
finds Queequeg frightening, he learns to look beyond the sensory information and to
judge the aborigine by his character rather than his appearance.
In a more telling example, Melville has Ishmael claim that the whale’s behavior
includes “suggestions of supernatural agencies, which eventually invested Moby Dick
with new terrors unborrowed from anything that visibly appears” (153). Melville
acknowledges that the white whale itself cannot be understood by mere perception and its
motivation cannot be judged directly by its actions. Even though Ahab perceives what
one may consider physical proof of the animal’s malign intent, its metaphysical
dimension remains mysterious to the whalers. In the chapter “The Whiteness of the
Whale,” Ishmael surpasses Ahab’s skepticism by arguing that nature willingly deceives
the individual because it “paints like the harlot, whose allurements cover nothing but the
charnel-house within” (165). Melville thus exposes the base materiality of and deception
of nature11 exemplified in “the monumental white shroud” of the whale that blinds the
individual of the true essence of nature (165).
Contrary to David Reynolds, I propose that Melville does not explore sensory
uncertainty because it is a popular topic in his time or because he enjoys the subversive
implications of such pyrrhonism. Rather his skepticism is grounded on the philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes. For instance, in his chapter “Of Man” (Leviathan I) Hobbes introduces
his readers to the basic assumptions about man’s inability to understand and analyze his
10

Interestingly, Melville takes a different stance in Billy Budd, Sailor (1924) when he
claims “moral nature was seldom out of keeping with the physical make” (Melville, Billy
104).
11
See chapter IV.
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environment by scrutinizing sensory perception. Sensory experience, Hobbes argues, is
triggered by outward objects that press against the inward “endeavor of the heart to
deliver itself” (13). However, Hobbes asserts that “the object” that executes this pressure,
“is one thing, the image or fancy is another” (10). Sensory perception therefore only
provides the image of an object, but does not grant us understanding of the object itself.
Any sensory experience is merely an inner reflex that is disconnected from the outside,
its reality. Significantly, sensation that may seem familiar to the individual may also be
reproduced by other means than the causes we naturally associate with them. Feelings of
warmth and cold and tactile sensations such as holding a cup or receiving a kiss, can
potentially be hallucinations because the mind may project on the body sensations that do
not come from actual stimuli from outside.
We see that Hobbes defines imagination as “decaying sense,”

12

meaning the

image of an object that appears before the sensory “inner eye” after the stimulus of the
senses is no longer present (11). Sensory perception does not enable man to directly
experience the world but merely represents the interior reaction of his organism to
exterior stimuli. Hobbes reasserts that sensual perception can be misguided by
malfunctioning, but also affirms that “God can make unnatural apparitions,” meaning that
He may use human senses as channels of communication (14). However, divine
communications of this type are unreliable at best, as the addressee of such
communication cannot determine its true cause with absolute certainty. Imagination, i.e.
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decaying sense, thus merely represents the reminiscence of previous sensory impressions
that are untrustworthy.
Consequently, Hobbes sees human faculties of perception and of abstract thinking
as unreliable means to ascertain reality. Hobbes argues further that all mental processes
based on these primary faculties of perception are unreliable as well. A train of thought
consists of a sequence of remaining images. If this sequence occurs “unguided, without
design13” it will produce visions and dreams (Hobbes 16). A “regulated” sequence
creates either knowledge about first causes, by enabling the individual to review past
events and evaluate their causal relation, or predictions about the future, by allowing the
individual to combine past experiences in a manner that is contrary to reality (Hobbes
16). For these reasons individuals will never have full control over the unguided portion
of their contemplative powers. If Melville’s leviathan is seen in the light of Hobbes’s
argument the manifestation of the white whale can be as much an illusion as it can be a
natural phenomenon. Perception is unreliable in either case, which forces individuals to
rely on supplemental data to make an informed judgment about sensory data.
While not being the only philosopher to address the certainty of the senses,
Hobbes surely sets a standard, which Benedict de Spinoza, Thomas Paine, and John
Henry Newman uphold. At best, the senses can supply human beings with preliminary
information of the world. This initial data must then be checked and verified by
principles that are independent from the sensory faculty in order to arrive at certainty
about the nature of sensation. Hobbes, as well as Benedict de Spinoza and Thomas Paine,
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suggests that reason alone provides such a reliable standard by which to judge sensory
information.
Melville’s contemporary, John Henry Newman, a Cardinal and former minister at
Oxford University, wrestled with the same demons. However, contrary to Hobbes,
Spinoza, and Paine, Newman advocates faith as the independent principle with which to
evaluate sensory information. Newman sees the argument about the unreliability of the
senses as proof of the quintessential human urge to know about principles exterior to
oneself. Faith, Newman argues, is an expression of this natural inner disposition, and thus
religion can be a guiding principle to evaluate sensory perception. Starting from this
general assumption, Newman distinguishes between “Natural and Revealed Religion”
(17). “Natural Religion” represents the human disposition towards faith, while “Revealed
Religion” refers to institutionalized faith that is based on authorities like scripture and
doctrine (Newman 17). Newman denies that “Natural Religion” could have evolved out
of “unaided reason,” but claims that “no people […] has been denied a revelation from
God” that attests to the “existence of powers exterior to this visible world” and thus
anticipates “the conclusions of Reason” (17, 18). Beyond that, Newman classifies
“Natural Religion” as a sensory enhancement that is provided by God as a gift, while
“Reason” in his system seems merely an auxiliary construct to support the findings to
which faith leads us (17).
Consciousness, Newman suggests, thus represents “a relation between the soul
and something exterior,” with sensory perception functioning as a mediator between the
two principles (18). At the same time, sensory perception creates an “obligation of
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acting” that supposedly informs us of “our moral nature” (Newman 19). The notion that
there is a difference between the inner self and the world outside compels the individual
to act in and influence his environment in order to explore the boundaries of this division.
Just like Melville, who describes Ahab’s vendetta with a giant whale in “The QuarterDeck,” Newman acknowledges that the individual feels heaped and tasked by the sensory
limitations that his environment imposes on him. The realization of this division, as
Melville and Newman seemingly agree, makes the individual quest for means to bridge
the gap between internal and external perception.
Obedience to this “inward law of Conscience” and activity represents to Newman
“the nature of Faith” (19). He proposes a model of consciousness in which God equips
man with an inner moral disposition that seems completely reliable. This model also
seems appealing in light of Hobbes, observation that sensory perception is merely an
inner movement triggered by an outer sensation. Newman seems to acknowledge Hobbes
by placing the guiding principle of the interpretation for the senses inside the individual,
but also admits to the “uncertain character” of this inward moral system, as a person still
follow his own inclination to obey or to ignore this inner voice (20). While “Conscience
is thus ever the sanction of Natural Religion,” man still needs to train and refine his
ability to hear the inward moral voice (20). A “Revealed Religion [,] supplies the
deficiency” of “Natural Religion” because scriptural authority and doctrine represent
reaffirmations of the principles that God bestows on mankind, but which man’s
inadequate sensory faculties cannot substantiate with absolute certainty (17, 22).
Therefore, faith must be one guiding principle in processing sensory data, but it must
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again be supplemented by yet another system of checks and balances and therefore
merely poses another level of uncertainty. Newman’s dual system of religion thus seems
to make matters worse rather than providing a solution to the dilemma.
In order to solve this new problem, Newman claims—quite contrary to Spinoza
and Hobbes—that the senses do provide us with “direct knowledge” of the material world
(205). Initially this claim appears to be a plea for the absolute certainty of human
perception. However, Newman argues that the immaterial world can be known through
“faculties analogous to sense,” faculties that he describes as quasi intuitive (205).
Unfortunately, Newman admits that “we have no consciousness of that perception or
influence,” as the human mind cannot process the reminiscence of divine interaction
(205). While acknowledging that we can have subconscious knowledge of God, Newman
implies that we can have no conscious understanding of God. Still Newman maintains
that while “Reason” expands the range of our perception beyond the senses and provides
“knowledge of things external to us,” it cannot function as a means to obtain spiritual
certainty (17, 206). Newman sees the resolution to this dilemma in having faith in faith.
Seeing that “we trust our senses in spite of their often deceiving us,” he argues that it
seems rational that we should equally trust our inner disposition to faith (Newman 213).
The human dependence on sensory certainty makes faith a creative faculty. Faith,
according to Newman, must be seen as an additional mode of perception, a sixth sense, of
which we can never be aware but that in combination with (scriptural) moral training of
our character compels us to believe.
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Accordingly, the need for supplemental concepts to evaluate sensory data leads
the philosophers to the search for alternative sources of spiritual trustworthiness. These
sources again become the object of scrutiny regarding their reliability, which expands the
problem of reliability from the personal realm to the realm of abstract concepts. The
divine origin of the Bible and its truthfulness therefore depend on individuals’ faith in
auxiliary constructs, which supplement sensory perception. What is more, divine
inspiration of texts and individuals becomes subject to personal inclination to believe in
such inspiration.
Prophets
Melville also explores ideas of supernatural inspiration and foreknowledge as a
principle theme in Moby-Dick. Just like the ancient prophets whose divine afflatus
rendered them insane in the eyes of man, Melville introduces his own prophet, Elijah, as
a deranged character, who warns Ishmael and Queequeg against shipping with Captain
Ahab. Eventually Elijah dismisses them both because their fates are “fixed and arranged
a’ready,” meaning that they will die with Ahab on sea (Melville 88). Elijah also claims
that Ahab “lost his leg last voyage according to prophecy” and thus introduces himself as
a seer (Melville 87). However, Ishmael considers Elijah “a humbug,” thinking that the
alleged prophet has been “a little damaged in the head,” as Elijah seems merely to tease
Ishmael and Queequeg without giving them any explicit information (Melville 88, 87).
Ishmael, the proponent of empiricism, ridicules Elijah’s obscure communication by
claiming that it is “the easiest thing in the world for a man to look as if he had a great
secret” (Melville 88). Ishmael rejects the unreliability of prophetic communication
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because Elijah’s revelation is uttered out of context. Nevertheless, Melville does not
simply dismiss Elijah, whose metaphors are as unassertive as those of Scripture, as a
kook the same way Ishmael does earlier on, for it is through Elijah that Melville
foreshadows Ahab’s catastrophe toward the end of Moby-Dick. Even though Elijah’s
prophecy comes true, Ishmael survives the encounter with the whale, even though,
according to Elijah, he should have died with the rest of the crew for shipping with Ahab.
Through this device, Melville clearly takes a differentiated look at the issue of
prophetic testimony and its reliability. Similarly, when Melville has Father Mapple open
his sermon on the prophet Jonah, the priest seems aware of the contemporary debate, for
he asks his congregation not to “mind now what that command [from God to Jonah] was,
and how conveyed”

14

(49). Mapple is concerned with the ubiquity of God and the

inscrutability of his will—not the trustworthiness of divine communication.
The problem of how a prophet may receive and explain the revelation of God is
specifically addressed in Thomas Hobbes’s discussion of prophets in Leviathan. Hobbes
claims that it is “impossible to know” whether a purported prophecy truly presents the
word of God (248). The truth of the account thus depends on the prophet’s authority
invested in him by his audience. What is more, the way in which God communicates with
the prophet cannot be distinguished from dreams or visions that are mere projections of
the prophet’s mind. The would-be seer himself might thus be unsure whether God spoke
to him or not. Hobbes suggests that “though God almighty can speak to man by dreams
[…] he obliges no man to believe he hath done to him that pretends it” (249). He further
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advises that a true prophet must prove himself by performing “miracles” and by teaching
only the religion that is “already established” (249). However, since “miracles now
cease,” man can no longer distinguish true prophets from the false ones (251).
Concurrently, only natural reason can test and verify the prophet’s utterance. Hobbes
narrows the group of true prophets down even further, when he asserts that God literally
spoke only to Moses and Christ (Leviathan III, xxxvi, p.277ff). Thus Hobbes seems to
question the authority of all but two divine prophets in the Bible, namely those who can
validate their own testimony by their status.
Hobbes makes it clear that the office of civil and spiritual government ought to
be united in one person – the sovereign king – as only the sovereign can interpret the
Word of God, i.e. His direct communication. Hobbes sees the sovereign is a reliable
prophet because he is a direct successor to Moses, who derived all privileges form his
original covenant with God.15 Thus Hobbes derives certainty of testimony from historical
lineage. Consequently, Hobbes attempt to legitimize prophets through their heritage
reveals Hobbes’s assumption that Moses was a historical rather than a literary figure.
Nevertheless, Hobbes continues to underscore the subjective nature of testimony.
Accurate testimony or “right reason,” he demands, has to be determined by “some
arbitrator, or judge” to whose judgment the community bows (Hobbes 28). Thus on the
issue of testimony, Hobbes specifies that the process of human discourse can never
produce factual knowledge, as this knowledge would be based on unreliable sensual
15
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perception. Prophetic testimony, can merely establish conditional knowledge about “the
consequence of words” (48). Accordingly, Hobbes perceives discourse about testimony
as merely describing the quality of accounts, rather than being an instrument that
ascertains the truthfulness of testimony. Prophets may thus interpret the past by means of
their own mental faculties, but they can make no reliable statements about the future.
Spinoza seems less critical and demanding than Hobbes in his evaluation of
prophetic testimony, as he praises “the imagination of the prophets” as being a part of the
divine mind (24). However, this prerequisite of imagination becomes a double-edged
sword as imagination impairs the prophet’s perception of God. According to Spinoza,
God appears in the form in which the prophet “usually imagined Him” (32). If God
therefore conforms His appearance to the prophet’s disposition, the prophet can never be
sure whether he saw God, or convinced himself that he saw God, or was simply
hallucinating or dreaming. Therefore, the prophet cannot be sure whether or he actually
spoke to God after the supposed fact, neither can he be certain about the meaning of
God’s supposed communication. Hobbes as to Spinoza, divine communication becomes
subject to interpretation and can therefore not function as a source of certainty.
Although prophetic testimony represents one of several doorways to divine
knowledge for Spinoza, this divine testimony can be erroneous and must therefore be
verified by reason. Similar to Hobbes, Spinoza provides three factors by which to identify
prophets: a vivid imagination, “the presence of signs,” and the prophet’s moral character
(29). However, Spinoza also acknowledges that neither of these categories is foolproof.
The distinction between true and false prophets thus adds yet another layer of uncertainty
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to the discourse because it is a subjective decision. Spinoza abandons doctrine and
challenges believers to judge by themselves on both the issue of prophets and the signs
that endow the prophets’ message with authority, an authority that depends as much on
moral character as on the performance of true miracles.

Miracles
Herman Melville and his ideological predecessors appear to dismiss human
testimony of supernatural events as unreliable. In the following section, I will scrutinize
Melville’s position on experiences that seemingly offset natural laws. Melville explicitly
addresses miracles in the chapter “Jonah Historically Regarded.” Here Melville’s narrator
introduces a comic element of doubt in form of a Sag-Harbor sailor that displays a “want
of faith” regarding the probability of Jonah being swallowed by a whale because the
beast’s throat “is so very small” that “‘a penny roll would choke him’” (287). Melville
further questions the Jonah story because it does not explain what kind of vessel Jonah
used for his voyage. Melville offers several theories about the nature of the leviathan that
swallowed Jonah, ranging from “the floating body of a dead16 whale” to “an inflated bag
of wind” (287). Granting that Jonah did in fact travel inside the whale, the narrator,
driven by the pyrrhonism of the Nantucket whaler, also questions how the beast could
circumnavigate Africa in three days, swim up the shallow waters of the Euphrates to its
source near Nineveh, and there to disgorge of Jonah. Eventually, Melville’s impassioned
narrator dismisses outright the religious doubts of the Sag-Harbor whaler as “foolish,
16
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impious pride,” the result of a “little [book] learning” and refers the clergy who testified
to the authenticity of the miracle of Jonah (288). The ironic tone of this passage can
hardly be ignored. Melville’s narrator introduces the discussion of Jonah’s story on the
basis of what he initially considered valid doubt. However, when he realizes that he
would have to oppose the “revered clergy” to pursue his deductive argument, the narrator
turns on his client and accuses him of impiety, just as the contemporary church would do
in confronting the issue (Melville 288). Even though Melville deals with the issue of
miracles in a comic fashion in this incident, the problem of verifying miracles presents a
central pillar of Christian religious and scriptural authority leading up to the nineteenth
century and remains volatile issue to this day.
Thomas Hobbes begins his discussion of miracles by distinguishing between God
and nature. The “right of nature” represents the “liberty each man hath to use his own
power […] for the preservation of his own nature” (86). Any law of nature is “found out
by reason” by the individual rather than scriptural evidence (Hobbes 86). Hobbes goes on
to define miracles as “a work of God (besides his operation by the way of nature,
ordained in the creation,) done for the making manifest to his elect the mission of an
extraordinary minister for their salvation17” (293). He distinguishes between subjective
“miracles” which are called so by individuals who are ignorant of the natural causation of
an event, and “real miracles” which represent “the effect[s] of the immediate hand of
God” (Hobbes 293). Hobbes reassures his reader that “there is nothing contrary” to
natural reason, and although he acknowledges God’s ability to offset the course of nature
17
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and to communicate with man via direct revelation, reason provides the touchstone for
understanding one’s place within divine providence (247).
Just like the Sage of Malmsbury, Spinoza eliminates the problem of individual
doubt by demanding that miracles are unnecessary to prove God’s existence. Spinoza
claims that miracles are defined objectively as events “of which the causes cannot be
explained by natural reason” (84). But miracles are unimportant to Spinoza because even
though they are events

“which surpass human understanding […] we can gain no

knowledge of God’s essence” from them (85). On the contrary, miracles “appeal
powerfully to the imagination” rather than to natural reason – which Spinoza considers
the only source of certain knowledge (86). However, according to Spinoza, God does not
communicate with man through obscure channels but deals in absolutes and necessity.
Therefore “phenomena which we clearly […] understand have much better right to be
called works of God” because they fall in line with God’s character as they express “the
infinity, the eternity, and the immutability of God” (Spinoza 86). To Spinoza, miracles
would represent a “contravention to the order which God has established in nature” and
thus “a contravention to God’s nature and laws” (87). Spinoza even goes on to assert that
whenever Scripture addresses miracles, it actually describes natural phenomena of which
mankind at the time was ignorant. Nevertheless only natural phenomena are explicit
evidence of God’s intervention in Spinoza’s system. For God to offset the natural cause
of events is illogical because a miracle implies that His creation is imperfect and requires
repeated adjustment to correct its course.
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A century after Spinoza in 1754 David Hume also discusses miracles in his essay
“Of Miracles.”18 Unlike Spinoza, Hume does not eliminate miracles completely from the
scope of his analysis, but rather claims that their categorization has been faulty in
previous analyses. Initially, Hume postulates a correlation between experience and reason
on the one side, and testimony and faith on the other. Man has an a priori inclination to
trust his memory and “regards his past experience as full proof” of future events (126).
Experience marks the weighing of empirical data that has the formation of a general rule
as its end. Testimony marks the other end of the continuum of certainty that Hume sets
up. Its validity depends on empirical factors like the “number of witnesses” for a certain
event, the manner of delivery of the message, i.e. the performance and authority of the
speaker (Hume 128). Hume asserts that “no testimony is sufficient to establish a
miracle,” as he claims that events that offset the laws of nature require solid, empirical
evidence and a “uniform experience” of multiple individuals (131, 130). Witnesses are
unreliable and their testimony can therefore never sufficiently establish a miracle.
Accordingly, the belief in miracles is often inspired by either ignorance or human
treachery, drafted up by individuals hungry for power who are then “industrious in
propagating the imposture” (Hume 136). According to Hume, one motivation for this
falsification of testimony is the authority and power that lies in assuming the role of “an
ambassador from heaven” (144).
However, Hume also asserts that false testimony concerning miracles may be
caused through the deception of the senses. Hume thus agrees with Hobbes that the
18
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senses are easily deceived and that a man with a “heated imagination” first makes “a
convert of himself” before he sets out to preach his sighting of a miracle to others (Hume
144). As he disqualifies human testimony as proof for miracles, Hume insists that
miracles be examined by neutral judges. Their evaluation should be detached from the
judgment of the masses because the vox popoli can be manipulated too easily.
Concurrently, Hume refutes miracles as “a just foundation for any [such] system
of religion,” as they can be “opposed by another proof, derived from the very fact which
it would endeavor to establish” (146). Hume suggests a method of deductive reasoning on
the basis of probability for the judgment of miracles. Since the likelihood of a miracle
actually happening is lower than the likelihood of a witness giving false testimony. Thus
in the majority of cases, Hume perceives miracles as more unreliable than the occurrence
of false human testimony. For this reason, the testimony of miracles always carries its
own refutation in its argumentation, but Hume does not completely rule out that “there
possibly be miracles” (147). As Spinoza before him, Hume acknowledges that testimony
would be a valid foundation for believing in a miracle if the testimony would
approximate a universal experience. If all historians in all countries report an event as a
fact, then we “ought to receive it as certain” (147). Miracles are thus judged quite
mathematically by comparing the “instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of
men” with the certified instances of “violation of the laws of nature by miracles” (148).
For Hume the validity of testimony thus depends completely on a process of computing
and comparing data of different sources.
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Despite the fact that Hume suggests to judge miracles by the standards of
deductive logic, he still asserts that “religion is founded on Faith, not on reason”19 (149).
Such belief requires more than reasonable evidence to be accepted as truth to the
individual. Although he does not account for the probability of miracles, Hume
acknowledges the creative element of inner conviction that faith requires. In these
respects, he has much in common with Cardinal John Henry Newman, who addresses the
same issue less than a hundred years later.
Newman discusses the reliability of miracles on the basis of his discussion of the
creative nature of faith. He acknowledges that the authenticity of miracles depends on
“considerations about testimony, enthusiasm, imposture, and the like,” but suggests that
true miracles ultimately are “the sort of proof a man does not make for himself, but which
is made for him” (Newman 192). Newman concedes that any eyewitnesses of miracles
are “already believers,” a fact that renders their judgment partial (196). Consequently, he
finds that the benefit of miracles does not lie in their contravention of “the physical laws
of the universe,” but rather in their didactic function of enforcing “moral laws” (Newman
196). Thus Newman’s perspective falls in line with the views of Melville’s fictional
priest, Father Mapple, a minor character that renders the philosophical conundrum all the
more interesting. However, Newman claims, in accordance with Spinoza, that miracles
are not tools to instill faith, but rather reassertions of the righteousness of faith for those
who adhere to their belief in the first place. In this context of didacticism of miracles,
Thomas Paine also finds miracles problematic, as the belief in miracles presupposes “a
19
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transfer of faith from God to man to believe a miracle upon man’s report” (67). Paine
rejects miracles as a valid form of communication between God and man and thus
disregards their instructive aspect that Newman and Melville’s Father Mapple would
embrace in the next century. Finally, Paine reasserts that miracles depend too much on
human faculties to function as a reliable source of information about God’s will.

Scriptural Authority
At this point I have shown how Melville questions sensory reliability and the
testimony of prophets and how he speaks out against the reliability of miracles, especially
in his chapter “Jonah Historically Regarded.” Closely related to these issues is Melville’s
attitude towards scriptural authority in Moby-Dick. In the chapter “The Sermon,”
Melville delivers a description of the teleological interpretation of scripture. Ishmael
hears Father Mapple’s sermon in a church in Nantucket. Mapple, expounds on a story of
Jonah, whom he calls a “prophet” whose “canticle in the fish’s belly” is a inspiring and
“noble thing” that teaches selflessness in the face of God’s commands (Melville 49). To
Mapple, the story represents merely “one of the smallest strands in the mighty cable of
the Scriptures”; but a telling lesson of how the “hard hand of God” becomes visible
through the force of the story’s imagery (Melville 49, 52). Reading Jonah on a literal
level, Mapple applies the moral of the story at this point to exhort his congregation. The
clergyman presents what he considers factual evidence from scripture. However, in the
chapter “Jonah Historically Regarded,” Melville’ narrator transcends Mapple’s literal
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reading and shows how “Jonah’s prodigy of pondering misery” can be read in various
ways (51).
Melville first has Father Mapple discusses the story’s literal meaning in the
chapter “The Sermon” and later lets Ishmael account for more critical approaches to the
story. In “Jonah Historically Regarded,” the narrator conjectures that the whale in Jonah
might be an allegory for Jonah being saved by “some vessel with a whale for a figurehead,” or that the whale is used symbolically and “merely meant a life-preserver”
(Melville 287). Melville foreshadows the technique of displaying subjective
interpretations, which he will exhibit in the chapter “The Doubloon.” Contrary to the
chapter about the doubloon though, Melville dismisses these historical, empirical,
allegorical, and symbolic reading of the whale in Jonah in favor of a literal canonical
reading. Nevertheless, “Jonah Historically Regarded” must be read as an ironic attack on
doctrine and biblical literalism, as I have shown in my discussion of miracles.20
As with the other concepts of uncertainty, the idea of scriptural uncertainty was
well established by the time Melville wrote Moby-Dick in the nineteenth century. Thomas
Hobbes notes almost three hundred years earlier that the “scripture was written to shew
man into the kingdome of God,” which exists only in the after life, “leaving the world
and the Philosophy thereof, to the disputation of man, for exercising their natural reason”
(58). The Bible thus evidently teaches “how to go to Heaven, not how the heavens go”
(Galileo qtd. in Andrews 63).21 Of course, one has to keep in mind that, Hobbes’s agenda
was to exhibit the king as the rightful sovereign and mediator of God’s word, and to
20
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invalidate clerical claims to political authority. Scriptural authority for Hobbes arises
from its analogy to the laws of nature. Scripture forms an expansion of the human faculty
of reason. Hobbes acknowledges that the original authorship of the individual biblical
chapters cannot be ascertained; still, the Book “is not unuseful to give us knowledge
about the time wherein they were written” (252). For example, Hobbes states, quite
controversially at the time, that Moses was not the author of the Pentateuch, and that “the
five Books of Moses were written after his [Moses’] time”
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(253). Nevertheless,

regarding the content of the Bible, Hobbes declares that “none can know that they are
God’s word” (259).
Similarly, Spinoza addresses the problem of textual transmission when he claims
that the Bible’s “foundations are not only too scanty for building upon, but are also
unsound,” partly because of carelessness of translation and compilation over the ages,
and partly because its “books were compiled from sources originally incorrect and
uncertain” (121, 154). Accordingly, a literal reading of the text will gain the reader only
limited insight into eternal truth and the nature of God. The reader can merely train
himself to know the cultural frame in which the Bible, or the individual books thereof
were written, in order to speculate about the author’s intention.
For these reasons, Spinoza claims that we can arrive at an understanding of God
through the study of the natural principles of causality, as “God’s existence is not selfevident” but that it must rather “be inferred from ideas […] incontrovertibly true,” i.e.
from natural laws (84, 85). Spinoza denies the authority of scripture, proclaiming that
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“men relate in chronicles and histories their own opinions rather than actual events” (92).
It is therefore “necessary to know the opinions of those who first related” the events in
question to arrive at their intentions and to correctly interpret their recordings (93).
Spinoza thus sharply distinguishes between the author’s intention and God’s will,
which means that we cannot know God’s will through scripture. However, both can be
known individually. As we have seen earlier, Spinoza believes that God’s intention can
only be inferred through the study of nature. However, we can arrive at the intentions of
the biblical authors however by analyzing the historical context in which they were
composing, “for many things are narrated in Scripture as real, and were believed to be
real, which were in fact only symbolical and imaginary”; a concept that the nineteenth
century Higher Critics would capitalize on (93). Accordingly, Spinoza asserts that texts
as well as authors have rhetorical agendas, which unfortunately are often impossible to
reconstruct or distinguish. Reconstruction becomes especially hard when it can no longer
be established whether the meaning of a text is factual or metaphorical, as it happens with
the Bible. Ultimately, Spinoza’s devastating verdict on scriptural authority is that “the
true meaning of Scripture is in many places inexplicable, or at best mere subject for
guesswork” (112). While Hobbes merely wanted to shift control over scriptural authority,
Spinoza annihilates it, stating that the true meaning of the text cannot by established by
any method and is purely subjective. If this philosophical debate is echoed in Melville’s
masterwork, then “The Doubloon” 23 is a key chapter to the entire novel.
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Spinoza’s inquiry leads him to conclude that the only standard by which scripture
is to be judged should be the “natural light of reason which is common to all – not any
supernatural light nor any external authority” (119). He questions direct divine revelation,
as reason to him seems the only reliable source for spiritual guidance. What is more,
numerous textual inconsistencies, like the question of authorship of the Pentateuch,
finally lead Spinoza to the conclusion that “the Bible is not so much imperfect as
untrustworthy” because it is a man-made account that has been handled without care and
critical scrutiny regarding the methodology of its compilation (120). This verdict deals a
blow to the central pillar of certainty that the Bible had provided for society up until the
seventeenth century. For if a text that was previously deemed holy and a direct account of
the will of God absolute truth and certainty become a matter of purely personal
preferences.
While Spinoza’s verdict about scripture is rather bleak, his outlook on the human
capacity to know God is quite optimistic. He suggests to avoid the danger of entangling
ourselves in the linguistic inconsistencies of scripture and to arrive at a more general
spirituality.24 He makes it clear that “the sacredness of Scripture depends on our
understanding of the doctrines therein signified, and not on the words, the language, and
the phrases in which these doctrines are conveyed to us” (150). As “words gain their
meaning solely from their usage” they cannot provide a proper basis to gain certainty
about God (167). The author asserts the subjectivity of testimony by claiming that
“nothing is in itself absolutely sacred, or profane […], apart from the mind, but only
24
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relatively hereto” (167). Spinoza thereby redirects authority from the text to the
individual. The mind is the proverbial measuring stick by which to judge Scripture
because it carries the “true original of God’s covenant” by providing mankind with the
“idea of Himself” (165).
Spinoza separates scripture and theology, proclaiming that true spiritual theology
teaches obedience to the divine principles already inscribed in the human heart, while
reason provides mankind with “truth and wisdom” (194). Basing theology on scripture
therefore is pointless, as theology already wields the same authority as reason. Spinoza
pontificates that “Theology is not bound to serve reason, nor reason theology, but each
has her own domain” (194). The only intersection of both fields of spirituality lies in
“the morality they teach,” and must correspond to “the Word of God written in our
hearts,” these moral principles, then, are the only standard by which to judge religion and
the prophets.
In 1843, John Henry Newman seemingly refutes Spinoza’s anti-scriptural theory
because Newman claims that scripture provides a “tangible history of the Deity,” which
creates “definiteness of the practical impression” by producing a “personal presence” of
God. In other words, Newman postulates that the Bible fleshes out the idea of God and
thus creates spiritual certainty (22). Newman also seems to agree with Hobbes that the
human mind cannot grasp God as an infinite concept. Melville exhibits this realization as
one of the central motivations for Ahab’s monomania, when the captain admits that he
hates the whale as an “inscrutable thing” (140). The quest for certainty lies in unraveling
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the mystery of the motivation behind natural forces. Ahab’s quest is to find out whether
the whale is “agent” or “principle” (Melville 140).
Newman states further that the Bible is a reliable document insofar as it teaches
“religious truths historically, not by investigation [as Natural Religion, i.e. reason]”25 but
through accounts of faith (30). Newman thus differentiates between historical reliability
and spiritual importance of the message communicated through scripture; the Bible does
not claim to be a history book, but it rather teaches us by incorporating historical
elements into its argumentation. Still, these elements are secondary to the moral values
that are communicated through the biblical stories. And while Newman acknowledges
that similar doctrines may be derived from heathen cults, he notes that no other source
“illustrate[s] virtue”
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like the Revelation of Christianity (34). The Bible thus

metaphorically verbalizes virtues that are ingrained in all human beings. Its value,
according to Newman, lies in its communication of a universal human experience.
Ultimately, Newman does assert that Scripture can communicate God’s will, as he
sees the “last and complete manifestation of the Divine Attributes and Will contained in
the New Testament” even though – as we have seen – this communication is not explicit
(35). Like Spinoza, Newman implies a positivistic anthropological worldview. The state
of moral innocence of the prelapsarian condition lies not beyond man’s reach in
Newman’s system. Through revealed religion mankind gets the chance to aspire “towards
a divine principle” (28) outside itself, a moral ideal that is free from moral corruption. By
teaching “self-denial,” scripture guides the individual’s view towards a higher moral
25
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principle (147). According to Newman, doctrine leads the way to the paradisial mindset
of “disinterested attachment,” signifying the mindset of Adam and Eve (28).
The most radical attack of scriptural certainty comes from Thomas Paine’s The
Age of Reason (1795). Paine performs a close reading of scripture – and revelation in
particular – and classifies it as a “book of riddles” created by “Church Mythologists,” the
content of which was “decided by vote”27 (18). While Spinoza merely points out the
uncertainty that lies in the composition of the Bible, Paine takes issue with the fact that
“vote stands in place”28 of divine inspiration in the creation of Scripture (166). Paine’s
demolishes biblical authority by enumerating the logical errors made by its compilers and
by audiences who read its contents as literal truth. Biblical authority to Paine is an
oxymoron. The Bible is a book compiled by human beings, not a flawless account of
God’s divine character. Paine asserts further that mankind “cannot even imitate so much
as one blade of grass that he [God] has made, and yet we can make or alter words of God
as easily as words of man”29 (166). Contrary to Newman and Spinoza, Paine’s evaluation
of the human capacity to gain divine knowledge seems pessimistic at best. Paine cannot
find any superior moral principle to be derived from scripture, as the accounts of human
misery and treachery with which the Bible is filled mark it as a “history of wickedness,”
not the Word of God (20). Scripture seems morally uninspiring to Paine, and he discredits
any creative aspect of faith that might be based on scriptural analysis.
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Paine compares the compilation of Scripture to the composition of poetry. The
prophets (nabi) are not oracles of the future but poets and historians. However, creative
faculties, according to Paine cannot lead to spiritual certainty because proof for the
existence of God has to hold up to rational, empirical standards. Contrary to Newman’s
notion that creativity is a necessary faculty of faith, Paine seems to sneer at the fact that
the authors of the Bible attempt to pass off inspired documents. Paine notes that since
there is always arbitrariness involved in human accounts, “human language, whether in
speech or print, cannot be the vehicle of the word of God” (24). Beyond that, scriptures
were not compiled by God, but rather by theological parties who “had no authority for
what they were doing” (Paine 111).
Consequently, Paine postulates that the Bible is easily corruptible and therefore
cannot function as a basis of faith. He sees nature as the only explicit expression of the
will of God. Paine thus joins Hobbes and Spinoza in their claim that scriptural testimony
is unreliable, but also demands that its authority should be completely disregarded. Paine
is much more radical than his ideological predecessors, since he plainly classifies
scripture as riddled by “inconsistencies and absurdities” (27). Again contrary to Newman,
Paine despises doctrine as it teaches man “to contemplate himself as an outlaw, […]
thrown […] on a dunghill at an immense distance from his Creator, and who must make
his approaches by creeping back and cringing to intermediate beings” (30).
Melville seemingly picks up on the rancor that Paine shows towards these
“intermediate beings” and recreates it in the nefarious zeal of Ahab in his pursuit of the
white whale (30). In “The Quarter-Deck,” Ahab feels challenged by the “inscrutable
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thing” in the whale, which he hates with a vengeance (Melville 140). He cannot accept
the pasteboard mask of the white whale as the closest that man can get to God. Ahab feels
compelled to “strike through the mask” to know the principle behind the agent, i.e. the
whale (Melville 140). Paine suggests man must use “the “the

GIFT OF REASON”

30

as his

metaphorical harpoon to strike through the veil of spiritual confusion that scripture
engenders (30).
Finally, Paine asserts “THE WORD OF GOD IS IN THE CREATION WE BEHOLD and it is
in this world […] that God speaketh universally to man”
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(31). Paine is quick to

establish that human language cannot communicate God’s nature. Scripture thus cannot
function as a source for certain knowledge about God; only nature, God’s visible
creation, can provide clues about his existence. He classifies God as “a first cause, the
cause of all things,”32 at which one may arrive through scientific contemplation (33).
Much like Spinoza, Paine disregards scripture as medium of God’s will. However, Paine
asserts only nature can do so when scientifically examined through reason. Man’s ability
to deduce cause from effect lets him arrive at God as the ultimate cause beyond which no
further investigation is possible. Accordingly, Paine sees scientific inquiry and objective
doubt, as the only valid means of ascertaining God’s existence. Man can arrive at this
result by realizing that “everything we behold carries in itself the internal evidence that it
did not make itself” (33). Melville’s “pasteboard mask” falls in line with Paine’s view of
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nature as a veil through which a “reasoning thing puts forth the mouldings of its features”
(Melville 140).
The survey of the tradition of philosophical doubt has demonstrated how volatile
and fractured the notion of truth and therefore spiritual stability had become in the
nineteenth century. As the examples from Moby-Dick show, Melville accurately
identifies and addresses the paramount philosophical issues of his time and displays a
high sensitivity to the pressing nature of the discussions about scriptural authority and
spiritual certainty. As we have now explored the philosophical context in which Melville
composed his novel, we will now scrutinize the practical means that the author employs
to resolve the problem of uncertainty, i.e. the concept of Melville’s charts.
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III. THE DOUBLOON AND MELVILLE’S CHARTS TO CERTAINTY
“The Doubloon” is one of the central chapters of Moby-Dick, one through which
Melville first communicates his methodology of obtaining certainty. Ahab nails a Spanish
coin to the main mast of the Pequod, proclaiming that whosoever raises the white whale
may obtain the golden prize. The doubloon becomes the object of various interpretations
provided by the different characters as they pass by the mast. By providing a close
reading of the coin’s meaning, each character projects his personality onto the object and
thus infuses it with meaning. In light of the personal construction of meaning, the
doubloon thus transforms into a multivalent cipher. Melville thus uses the doubloon as a
prism of interpretation that refracts each character’s strategy of making sense of the
human experience and thus of obtaining certainty.
However, the doubloon does not remain the only postmodernist stage prop that
Melville uses in the text. The crew of the Pequod uses various objects as a means to
bridge the void of uncertainty that existence places before them. These objects are visual
representations of meaning, i.e. Melville’s “charts” on his quest for certainty. Charts
appear in various forms in the text: Ahab’s whale charts, the doubloon, and even
Queequeg’s tattoos—all represent tools that aid the characters to deduce meaning from
phenomena that they cannot explain; in nautical terms, these implements are compasses
through the uncharted waters of existence.
Melville’s “charts” represent signifiers for the characters that utilize them to
navigate through a hostile natural environment and to counteract the feelings of
instability and isolation that existence brings forth in them. Following Martin
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Heidegger’s concept of “being thrown into the world,”33 many characters in Moby-Dick
convey an air of displacement and disorientation. For example, Ishmael learns that the
owners of the Peqoud are mostly “widows and orphans” (Melville 76). In fact, Ishmael
himself sets out to escape a “November” in his soul that makes him wish to knock
“people’s hats off,” which indicates that he experiences strong feelings of unsociability
and isolation ashore that he strives to shed off on the ocean (18). These minor plot details
also establish dislocation as a fundamental theme in the novel.
Existence is puzzling to all characters that attempt any form of critical
contemplation of reality. The significance of the chapter “the Doubloon” thus arises from
the fact that it displays the various characters’ associative and contemplative assets.
Metaphorical charts are used in various ways throughout the novel: While Flask—and to
a certain extent Stubb—see the doubloon as a material means to pleasure, Queequeg
consults the stars and his tattoos in the process of making decisions. Meanwhile Captain
Ahab initially relies on a sextant and an actual chart to obtain certainty about the course
of the whale. Ultimately he disregards every tool and completely relies on his instinct to
chase the whale. Ahab’s emancipation from all “charts” represents the climax of
Melville’s experimentation with charts. While I do not believe that Melville suggests for
the reader to abandon all charts and to rely solely on instinct, the novel, especially
through Ahab, explores the ramifications of complete isolation from reason and society
for the individual.
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thrown into the world) in the twentieth century, as it occurs in his treatises Being and
Time (Sein und Zeit 1927, §31).
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The Coin as an Existential Cipher
The coin that Ahab nails to the main mast poses as the ultimate social hieroglyph
in Melville’s quest for religious and existential certainty. Although not the only “chart” to
meaning in the book, the doubloon bundles meaning infused into it by the various
characters who examine it; the coin represents the multiplicity of perspectives, which is
one of the main themes of the novel. The act of interpretation thus is a necessary means
of creating stability for Melville. According to Bernhard Radloff, Melville considers “the
movement of presentation as” an act of “making certain” (186). Melville represents the
doubloon as “the ship’s navel” because it is the focal point that concentrates the
contemplative powers of the crew (335). Thus the coin can potentially function as a
symbolic provider of stability, if it can bring one or several characters to establish
absolute certainty in the meaning of existence. However, further analysis will show that
this is an unrealizable task.
On a basic level of interpretation, one may relate the doubloon to another signifier
of meaning in the text: the white whale. The leviathan to Ahab represents “all evil […]
made practically assailable” (Melville 156). Ahab believes he can decipher the meaning
of his own existence by killing the whale. To Ahab the whale thus becomes both an end
itself and a means to this end. However, if the whale is the ultimate representation of the
hidden principle that steers the course of the world, the doubloon stands firmly connected
to it as the ultimate signifier of the multiplicity of interpretation. The coin is the “white
whale’s talisman” and a token of its life (Melville 332). As Melville has Ishmael classify
the coin as one of the “medals of the sun,” the doubloon mirrors the whale’s supernatural
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origin (332). “The Doubloon” illustrates that all physical objects are signifiers and thus
receive significance only through human interpretation.
Melville acknowledges the impossibility of objective truth. The doubloon does
not have a fixed meaning. In fact, Pip, the deranged cabin boy, provides a reading that
expresses this notion of multiplicity when Melville has him comment on the procession
that passes by the coin: “I look, you look, he looks; we look, ye look, they look” (335).
By his antics, Pip expresses the pluralism involved in the interpretation of the doubloon,
as it can have as many meanings as it may have spectators to contemplate its mystery.
Like a convex lens bundles sunbeams, the coin consolidates all the interpretations of its
meanings offered by the crew. Accordingly, Pip considers the metaphor of the “ship’s
navel” (Melville 335) closer when he examines the doubloon. He sees the doubloon as
the sign of natural birth but at the same time as the harbinger of the ship’s destruction.
Pip seems quite sure at this point that “the White Whale; he’ll nail” Ahab and his ship
because the coin is the symbol of the whale and it sits at the ship’s center (Melville 335).
Pip thus is the first to detect the instability that the coin creates through its physical
position on the ship. The Pequod literally carries the symbol of its dismemberment at its
heart. Thus one might argue that Pip rightfully considers the rest of the crew as blind
“bats,” while he sees himself as a “crow,” i.e. a bird of prey, indicating that he is the only
one that realizes the doom that the coin symbolizes. Melville seems to indicate that
wisdom can only be revealed by the insane by rendering Pip the one character that fully
realizes the destructive implications of the coin as the whale’s symbol.
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Starbuck’s Doubt
The “Doubloon” thus demonstrates each character’s philosophical approach to
life’s mysteries and displays the ways in which each persona tries to chart its course
through life. As a character, Starbuck most closely resembles Herman Melville’s own
psychological disposition. Starbuck’s spiritual crisis parallels Melville’s own, as the first
mate finds himself entangled in a conflict between duty and moral responsibility.
Melville repeatedly stresses the steadfastness of Starbuck’s character, through the dialog
among the rest of the crew. Starbuck is a man of strong faith and strong integrity. While
he calls Ahab’s quest blasphemous he cannot bring himself to take the mad captain
prisoner. In several instances throughout the plot when Starbuck debates this inner
conflict he indeed seems to be “wrestling with an angel”34 (388). After the captain
threatens him with a rifle, Starbuck considers assuming command over the Pequod, but
drops the thought as he sees “no lawful way […] to wrest this old man’s [Ahab] living
power from his own living hands” (Melville 387). Contrary to Ishmael, whose role is
purely contemplative, Starbuck feels morally compelled to take action and resist
participating in Ahab’s diabolic quest. However, his doubt prevents him from taking up
the cause and assuming control over his fate. Accordingly Starbuck sees himself standing
“alone here upon the open sea” unable to take action even in light of the knowledge that
“Starbuck’s body this day week may sink, with all the crew” (387).
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Note that this phrase refers to Jacob’s wrestling an angel (Genesis 32:24). Starbuck,
like Jacob is in a spiritual crisis. However, different than Jacob, Starbuck does not gain a
blessing form his “angel,” which is rather his spiritual doubt personified in Ahab
(Melville 388).
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Unlike Ahab, who is all action and braving steadfastness of will, Starbuck
represents integrity without defiance. Starbuck is the mediator whose objective is peace
on the ship and an even flow between the different personalities on the ship. However, he
lacks the incentive to take action because he faces internal moral struggles. Although
Starbuck displays a supreme moral disposition, he opts to ignore the inner and outer
conflicts he encounters. His reaction to the coin in “The Doubloon” is no exemption of
this behavior pattern. He perceives the doubloon as a “beacon and a hope,” a symbol of
God’s presence, but also as a sign of the immanent threat posed by the white whale (333).
Starbuck seeks to deny this feeling of ambiguity of existence when he beholds the coin.
He dreads that “truth [may] shake” him “falsely” 35 (Melville 333) if he lingers with it
any longer and ultimately turns away. Starbuck thus suppresses his instinct and tries
desperately to rely on his faith to carry him through crisis.
Starbuck cannot help questioning his own faith when regarding the coin. He seeks
to deny the uncertainty of his faith when he dreads that “truth [may] shake” him “falsely”
while beholding the doubloon (Melville 333). Accordingly, his generic verdict about
conditions that contradict his moral disposition is “let faith oust fact” (Melville 373).
Starbuck finds himself victimized by his intellect, which constantly threatens his faith.
This inner conflict puts him in a deadlock between reason and faith rendering him unable
to act. Beholding the doubloon paralyzes Starbuck with doubt. His rendering of the coin
exhibits his lack of will to action, despite his exemplary moral disposition. It seems clear
that for Starbuck the doubloon functions as a mirror that shows his spiritual weakness.
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However, not all characters share Starbuck’s introspective notions, when examining the
coin. In fact some, like Stubb, provide an interpretation that is more concerned with the
surface of the coin and therefore their own surface.

Stubb’s Alamanac
Melville notes how Stubb observes a train of characters passes by the coin in
order to find the “clue” that must be hidden “somewhere” (334). However, Stubb’s
reading of the object of everyone’s desire remains purely linear, as he believes that there
is only one truth to be discovered in the object. The coin bears the signs of the zodiac;
thus Stubb conjectures its meaning must lie in the doubloon’s symbols and therefore lies
open to anyone who can look up their meaning “straight out of the book,” i.e. Nathaniel
Bowditch’s vastly popular American Practical Navigator (1802) (Melville 334). The
almanac contains information about celestial navigation that Bowditch—originally
trained as a mathematician—collected on his voyages. Seeing that the almanac is
composed with a practical methodology, Stubb finds his practical attitude towards life
reflected in the book. In fact, Stubb holds a ideology directly opposed to any kind of
rational interpretation, as he comments rather practically that “there is nothing wonderful
in signs” as he observes that only human beings “come in and supply the thoughts” about
the texts and objects (Melville 333, 334). His attitude represents hostility against the
postmodernist notion that the physical world consists of the text and is therefore open to
interpretation. As a character, Stubb therefore counteracts the intuitive methodologies
that Melville evokes with Queequeg and Ahab. Like Starbuck, Stubb is a practical
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seaman, but Melville makes him less concerned with philosophical dilemmas and more
focused on physical pleasures and material wealth, which he embraces with “unusual but
still good-natured excitement” (236).
For instance, Stubb’s interpretation of the coin bears similarities to the purely
materialist reading of Flask, who considers the doubloon only in terms of its pecuniary
value. Like Starbuck, Stubb has realized that “all things are queer,” referring to material
experiences in the world (Melville 112). Stubb thus is well aware of the need to interpret
experiences, but also knows about the moral turmoil this philosophizing may cause. Thus
he has established a linear system of reference for himself that provides him with
authoritative certainty. In modern terms, he outsources the process of interpretation that
all other characters perform on their own, to Bowditch’s almanac, to which he resorts for
guidance. To Stubb all objects found in the physical world are symbols whose correct
interpretation can simply be looked up in reference works (Melville 333). Contrary to
Starbuck, obtaining certainty does not pose a philosophical dilemma to Stubb, as he has
chosen to accept the simplest authority to provide him with answers. His logic is
reasonable because as a sailor, he naturally follows the advice provided by the navigation
handbook. Stubb’s interpretations are neither creative (Ishmael), nor philosophical
(Ahab), nor based on spiritual faith (Starbuck) but rather result from blind faith in
authority. Stubb accepts the pregiven interpretation of the coin that he finds in his
almanac rather than drawing conclusions by his own contemplative power.
Accordingly, Stubb uses a pre-given chart—the almanac—for his quest. Contrary
to Ahab, Ishmael and Queequeg though, Stubb’s quest is not metaphysical but practical.

53

For him whaling is not a metaphorical quest36 to arrive at spiritual certainty. On the
contrary, his quest of killing—and eating—the whale has no metaphysical dimension.
The almanac supplies him with all information necessary to achieve this goal. Stubb’s
interpretation of the coin is therefore unimaginative as it only regards the coin in terms of
the nautical information it carries. Consequently, his occupation with the coin only lasts
as long as it takes Stubb to identify the star constellations depicted on the coin. While his
reading of the coin itself seems one-dimensional, his description of the zodiac as a
“sermon […] writ in high heaven” seems rather creative and lively (Melville 334). Stubb
acknowledges the deterministic aspect of nature as he describes how the star
constellations metaphorically influence the fate of humanity. As Radloff notes, Stubb
thus considers the coin “plot of fortune” because of the star constellations depicted on it.
Ironically, this leads Stubb to a similar notion of determinism to that which Ahab
discovers later in the novel37 (187). Contrary to Ahab though, Stubb does not venture to
understand this metaphysical plot or the driving forces behind it. As Melville notes,
Stubb finds consolation wheeling through “toil and trouble […] alow” while watching the
sun and the stars do the same aloft (334). He can render his existence meaningful because
he performs the same motion than the celestial bodies. Thus his existence is one of
imitation and of reading, without the need for critical investigation into the meaning of
his actions.
Melville pokes fun at literal-minded readers of scripture through Stubb, as his
attitude represents hostility towards the postmodernist notion that the physical world
36
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consists of text and therefore requires continuous interpretation. The recalcitrant second
mate completely relies on scriptural evidence to determine his actions, even though he
uses a surrogate Bible in form of his almanac. As Stubb’s “eleventh commandment” is
“think not” Melville endows Stubb with the bliss of confidence in authorized
interpretations of texts (112). Stubb relishes in finding simple answers to the complex
questions life puts in front of him. While the doubloon might appear multi-dimensional to
the other crewmembers, for Stubb its meaning resides in his handbook, which explains
coin’s hieroglyphs. To seek any meaning beyond the horizon of the almanac would
require creative, critical, and independent thought—something that Stubb’s nature cannot
conceive of. His ignorance of critical strategies of interpretation provides him with
certainty and happiness.
Through Stubb’s reading of the coin, Melville casts apprehension on readers who
refuse to use their own metal powers to attain certainty. Surprisingly, Melville himself
seems a bit envious of individuals like Stubb, who do not feel compelled to quest for the
deeper signification of the coin, because Melville’s complex moral imagination does not
allow him to settle for simple answers. Consequently, Melville does not end his
investigation into the doubloon’s meaning with Stubb’s interpretation. On the contrary,
Melville introduces yet another character that looks to celestial constellations to chart his
course on his quest for certainty: Queequeg.
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Queequeg’s Tattoos
All the charts that Melville uses in the text are compiled to reconnect their owners
with the divine. Queequeg supports this thesis unlike any other character in the novel.
The markings on his body, according to Ishmael, are a “complete theory of the heavens
and the earth, and a mystical treatise on the art of attaining truth,” as he uses his own
body to map the events he faces in life (Melville 366). Furthermore, a “departed prophet
and seer” created Queequeg’s tattoos; Melville thus indirectly deals with the authenticity
of prophecy through Queequeg, making his role as a living chart even more cryptic. Thus
Queequeg is the keeper of knowledge which he does not fully understand. Similar to
Ahab thus, Queequeg represents a character that bears a level of spiritual alienation,
although other than Ahab’s alienation represented in his scar, Queequeg is spiritually
alienated; yet his markings are voluntarily inflicted and thus symbolize a positive
spiritual disposition. As shown in “The Doubloon,” Queequeg’s physique only becomes
disconnected from his psyche when he interprets supernatural occurrences, making him
fall into a trance.
Beongcheon Yu states that Queequeg' personifies the “riddle” of human existence
and confirms that “Melville rather than Ishmael must try to unfold” the secret behind the
cipher (Yu 120). Yu thus suggests to broaden the meaning of Queequeg’s character and
to see his tattoos as a visual representation of man’s willful alienation from himself.
Queequeg therefore functions as a living map in Melville’s quest for certainty. But the
tattoos are a map that strips meaning from whichever object their bearer beholds. Similar
to Stubb, Queequeg does not develop a contextual signification when scrutinizing the
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doubloon, but only compares the symbols depicted on the coin with the symbolic
reference system of his body. He thus translates the coin’s implied meanings onto his
own fixed system of reference (the tattoos) to reduce the plethora of possible
interpretations of the doubloon. Thus for Queequeg translation precedes interpretation, as
certainty can only be derived from a system of symbols that is completely intelligible to
its user.
In this manner, Queequeg uses his own body as a reference guide for unknown
phenomena, just as Stubb uses his almanac. The indigenous harpooner compares the
constellations of the stars with the tattoos on his body to predict future events. Radloff
notes that Queequeg’s “cosmological Komparatistik”38 counteracts “Christian pretensions
to know the one true God” and represents a “critique of the rising humanist religions of
comparative anthropology and mythology” (187). Melville gives Queequeg’s a binary
role as both instrument and conduit of divine power. Even Stubb observes this doubling
when he sees Queequeg looking at the doubloon, noting that the cannibal “looks like the
zodiac himself” (Melville 335). Melville contrasts Stubb as a metaphorical uninformed
reader, who needs a conduit outside of himself to make sense of the world, with
Queequeg in the role of an informed reader, who synthesizes meaning by processing new
data with analytic tools.
Queequeg is similarly related to almost all other characters in the novel. For
example, Ishmael uses empirical science for his investigation of the skeletal remains of
the whale in “A Bower in the Arsacides,” while Queequeg uses the marks on his body to
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predict future events. Melville thus postulates the validity of Queequeg’s mysticist 39
approach in several instances in the text. Also, when Ahab beholds St. Elmo’s Fire during
the storm described in “The Candles,” Melville connects Queequeg to the white arch
lights that foreshadow the Pequod’s doom, as his “tattooing burned like Satanic blue
flames on his body” (381). In this instant Queequeg’s tattoos become a sensor for
supernatural forces and thus make a mediator—an avatar, if you will—between the
physical and the spiritual world. Ahab, being aware of this mystical connection, asks for
the blood of “Tashtego, Queequeg, and Daggoo” when he baptizes his harpoon in the
name of the devil; he apparently preserves the three indigenous harpooners as vessels of
supernatural power, a power that Ahab’s harpoon can tap into as a conduit (Melville
371). Melville thus describes how Ahab utilizes the mystical powers of the “heathen
flesh” to forge his supernatural weapon (371). Consequently, Queequeg’s role in the
novel is threefold: he becomes his own chart, a tool to Ahab, but also a friend and partner
to Ishmael.
Interestingly, the only other character that functions as a living chart is Moby
Dick himself. Ahab depicts the whale as a supernatural “brutal monster” that is part of a
“creation” that is “not an act of love but of hatred” (Herbert 1613, 1614). In contrast to
the whale though, Queequeg rather functions as a pacifier to Ishmael. In fact it is safe to
say that Queequeg’s friendship initiates a process of reconciliation between Ishmael and
humanity. Yu thus notes that Queequeg contributes to Ishmael’s – and therefore
39
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Melville’s – quest by providing the gift of “universal fraternity” (120). On the one hand,
the pair of Ahab and the whale is tied to each other through a cosmic vendetta, with Ahab
seeking to avenge the “cosmic affront” against him (Herbert 1614). Queequeg and
Ishmael on the other hand are connected by, the bonds of brotherhood, and even by the
yoke of marriage. Finally, the two living ciphers, the whale and Queequeg both appear as
agents of fate. As Herbert notes, the whale is the “symbol of a malignant God” who
inflicts “swift punishment” on Melville’s various representations of Jonah, while
Queequeg portrays the humane character of the noble savage in his relation to Ishmael
(1615, 1614). Ultimately, Queequeg indirectly counteracts the whale’s destructive force
and becomes instrumental in Ishmael’s Jonah like redemption when his coffin functions
as Ishmael’s lifeboat. As his tattoos are transferred to his coffin they form a chart that
transcends the barrier between life and death.
Queequeg’s character underscores the importance of community. Ironically it is
only when Ishmael seeks to escape society by boarding a whaling ship that he makes
Queequeg’s acquaintance and finds a loyal friend in him that helps him to chart his way
back into the community of man. Although the role of Ishmael shall not be elaborated at
this point, it seems noteworthy that Yu sees Ishmael as a mediator between Ahab’s
aggression and Queequeg’s humanity. He has to “exalt ‘democratic dignity’ and ‘divine
equality’ as he remains a quester like Ahab, despite the stoic influence of Queequeg (Yu
122). The cannibal thus also fulfills an instrumental role for Ishmael as he poses as the
wanderer’s chart to regain his sense of community.
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Ahab’s Charts and Sextant
Ahab’s course in the novel guides him away from humanity and into his
monomaniacal obsession with doom. The captain is also the only character in the text that
actually utilizes literal charts. Ahab initially uses conventional instruments to locate the
whale on the open sea. However, his methods become more mysterious as he grows more
and more convinced that his encounter with the whale will not occur by following his sea
charts, but the cosmic decrees of his destiny. At the beginning of Ahab’s quest, he still
needs a conductor to make contact with the supernatural realm. Melville describes how
Ahab seems to receive “secret intelligence from the deity” when studying his charts
(167). In utilizing such tools as the charts or the sextant, Ahab becomes passive and
contemplative. He intrudes on Ishmael’s modus operandi in studying charts and reading
the whale’s trail in the “waves storied with his deeds” (Melville 168). Of course, the act
of marking “additional courses over spaces that before were blank” on the chart,
symbolizes the act of rendering the unknown familiar (Melville 166). As Harold Aspiz
points out in "Phrenologizing the Whale" (1968) Ahab’s charting of the ocean as the
realm of the whale narrows down the meaning of the supernatural leviathan by giving it a
“tangibleness and certainty”40 (Fowler qtd. in Aspiz 22). If Ahab can track the route of
the whale takes, he can virtually locate him at any given moment. The whale would no
longer follow an incomprehensible route and would thus loose at least part of its mystical
ubiquity. A major element of suspense surrounding the whale consists in its ubiquity. By
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deciphering the whale’s hidden movements, Ahab demystifies the demi-god to a mere
malignant animal that can be hunted down and eventually killed.
Aspiz suggests further that Ahab wants to confront “nature unveiled in her true
light” (22). However, Ahab’s reasoning is flawed because he cannot hope to give rational
mathematical form to the movements of an agent of a supernatural principle. On the
contrary, supernatural goals require supernatural means. Ahab realizes his error in “The
Quadrant,” when he curses the “foolish toy” as it can only tell him “the poor, pitiful
point” of its own location, but not the future location of Moby Dick (Melville 378). The
quadrant’s alleged “impotence” as a nautical tool enrages Ahab as it ultimately reflects
his own impotence to find the white whale.
Being the whale’s counterpart and nemesis, the captain too, has to undergo a
transformation. Accordingly, his own methods have to be adapted to the supernatural
pursuit he embarks on. When he discards the quadrant, Ahab’s will is not fully formed
according to the object of his pursuit. He has to “tranquilize his unquiet heart” in order to
force himself to “cautious comprehensiveness” (Melville 168). On the issue of Ahab’s
inner conflict, Bernhard Radloff also notes in Will and Representation: The Philosophical
Foundations of Melville's Theatrum Mundi (1996) that Ahab displays a split between
mind and soul41 in the chapter “The Chart.” He “allows us to distinguish between the
agency of the vengeful scheming will; the ‘characterizing’ mind; and the ‘eternal […]
soul’” (Radloff 141). It is only when he abandons science and empiricism by disregarding
the charts and the sextant, that Ahab can confront the whale. He abandons secular means
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of pursuing the whale because he realizes that the whale and he are equals. If the whale
operates by supernatural means, so must Ahab because they are both chess pieces in a
fated battle. Thus Ahab can only engage the whale in combat when he embraces and fully
assume the metaphysical role of “Fates’ lieutenant” (Melville 418).
Through Ahab, Melville thus finds a new way of underscoring the fundamental
division between faith and scientific knowledge. Initially, Ahab does not realize that his
crusade against the white whale requires supernatural means to achieve his ends. Only
when he comes to terms with his spiritual aspect of his quest, i.e. when he embraces his
madness and the deterministic nature of his actions during the second “Chase” chapter,
does Ahab becomes fully armored for the final battle with Moby Dick. Once Ahab makes
this fundamental choice of a supernatural method, his choice of charts becomes suitable
for his ends.
On the verge of his final confrontation with the “God-whale,” Ahab’s opinion
about his mission turns drastically as he considers himself the “Fates’ lieutenant”
(Melville 418). However, before he changes his ideology, Ahab seems preoccupied with
self-agency during most of the plot. The “The Doubloon” chapter demonstrates this as
well, because Ahab reads his own signification into the signifier, i.e. the coin: “all are
Ahab” (Melville 332). One may argue that Ahab has to expand his megalomania to
extraordinary proportions in order to be a match for the god-whale in the ensuing battle.
Ahab’s ego even expands to encompass other members of the crew. For example,
Starbuck finds his soul “overmanned […] by a madman” but still feels “tied” to Ahab by
an inexplicable bond of horror (Melville 144). But despite the fact that monomania has
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been made the defining character trait of Ahab in the text’s critical history, he is by no
means a static character, as his eventual turn towards Calvinism demonstrates.42
Ahab adapts his methodology when he baptizes his harpoon with blood in “The
Forge.” He continues to use supernatural means to chase the whale when he consults the
corpusants in “The Candles,” claiming that “the white flame but lights the way to the
White Whale” (Melville 382). It seems that he worships St. Elmo’s Fire as his “fiery
father,” and challenges the supernatural manifestation, proclaiming: “I know of me what
thou knowest not of thyself” (Melville 383). However, Ahab is a Zoroastrian,43 he
perceives the deity of truth and purification in the flames, as opposed to the deceiving
principle of the pasteboard mask that he finds in Moby Dick. Interestingly here,
“Zoroaster consistently contrasts […] two peoples as the People of Righteousness (asha)
and the People of the Lie (druj),”44 a notion that corresponds to Ahab’s dual assessment
of himself and the whale as mortal enemies (“Zoroastrianism” Columbia). In addition,
Alan Williams notes that the evil spirit “Angra Mainyu and his demons are actually states
of negativity, denial or, as the religion puts it, ‘the Lie,’” which explains Ahab’s
obsession with unraveling the true nature of the whale (“Zoroastrianism” Routledge).
Therefore to oppose the treacherous god-whale, Ahab’s monomania expands into a
deification of his self in his encounter with nature. He claims that he is self-sufficient and
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an equal to the forces of nature. Therefore, his weapons to hunt down the whale can only
be of the same supernatural origin.
Like no other character in Melville’s novel, Ahab embodies the iconoclastic age
in which Melville was writing.45 In the context of Melville’s quest for certainty,46 Ahab
represents relentless questing by all means. Melville’s psychological need for religious
belief is played out to its most extreme conclusion. Accordingly, Melville’s fashions
“from his own race and time his own Prometheus” to take up his cause and to quest
without conscience (Taylor qtd. in Parker 178). Ahab loses his humanity in the hunt and
thus becomes unfit to provide Melville with a practicable solution to the issue of
uncertainty. If we assume that Melville creates Ahab to explore the possibility of
monomaniacal questing, the creature (Ahab) ultimately fails to provide its creator
(Melville) with the philosophical insight that the latter craves. Ahab embarks on a quest
without conscience, a chase without scientific charts or moral limits on which Melville,
due to his social obligations, cannot follow in the real world. Thus Ahab’s questing
without limits hardly presents the final solution to Melville’s dilemma, as Ahab’s
methodology does not consider the quester’s humanity.47 However, Ahab exhibits the
action of a man that follows the modus operandi suggested by the quest to its ultimate
conclusion. To acquire knowledge of God that transcends faith and becomes factual
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certainty, the quester has to transcend existence itself. Ahab follows through with his task
and like the first protoplasts in Eden, suffers the same punishment.

Melville’s Reading of His Charts
Charts in their various forms play an important role in Melville’s quest for
certainty. He plays out his spiritual quest on the cardboard map of Moby-Dick’s fictional
plot. Each of the pieces –i.e. each of the characters— follows a different course mapped
out by a different chart, in its pursuit of certainty. In order to establish certainty, Melville
appropriates pagan mysticism, and fatalism in his arsenal of the investigative methods
employed by the various characters. Seen in combination, his characters cover a
methodological spectrum that is as wide as a whole ocean, while Melville, in Hegelian 48
fashion, sits back and watches the products of his mind pursue their individual quests for
him.
Charts help Melville’s characters to cope with a seemingly hostile and secretive
nature. Significantly, all charts lead their holders to a crossroad in their journey where
they have to choose between their temporal existence and the fulfillment of their
respective quest. Ahab’s final encounter with the whale and Ishmael’s rescue are two
examples of this narrative strategy which Melville pursues with his charts. Seeing that
any literal chart can only provide its holder with a linear course, I suggest that the
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concept of the chart in itself already suggests fatalism and finality. A chart establishes a
correlation between the beginning and the end of a journey. Therefore a chart can only
point to a finite number of locations. In like manner, charts by their very nature only
allow for a finite number of interpretations of the events that Melville’s characters
encounter. As suggested in Moby-Dick and especially in “The Doubloon” chapter,
existence is more complex than any manmade map that portends to render life
meaningful can render it. The metaphysical aspect, i.e. the need to believe, in the human
experience cannot be gagged by a chart. Charts are thus in adequate instruments for the
attainment of certainty because they can only be as useful as their embedded principles
are effective in ascertaining truth.
A chart and any representation thereof can only be an auxiliary device that helps
its interpreter to make sense of the world. This device is necessarily a construct or
representation of a reality that is removed from the thing itself. The reader of charts must
thus either accept this inherent limitation of his tool or must completely disregard all
charts. By endowing his principal characters with their own charts, Melville establishes
that they must first define their own truth before embarking on their quests for certainty.
Despite their shortcomings, charts are means to appropriate reality and indicators for the
subjective nature of truth. Concurrently, the result of each quest for certainty can only lie
within the scope of the specific chart that the quester chooses; the knowledge attained
thereby will only support the predisposition of the quester. Thus, Melville seems to
suggest that only questers with unconventional methods that lie outside their limited
perview can obtain truly new knowledge. Melville then warns of the danger of losing
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one’s identity in the pursuit of certainty. The quester’s own humanity appears to be the
only limitation that Melville puts to the means of pursuit of certainty. For like the
forbidden fruit in Eden, certain knowledge in matters of spirituality is for the gods alone.
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IV. DISSECTING THE WHALE
Herman Melville’s assessment of the issue of uncertainty in the nineteenth
century, as well as the examination of his technique of charting with which he attempts to
resolve this issue, leads us to the third part of the discussion of uncertainty. Melville
presents multiple potential approaches to solve the problem of attaining certainty in a
treacherous and hostile world. I have demonstrated how Melville has assessed the issue
of uncertainty as a psychological deficiency of his age and how charting presents the
strategy to resolve these issues. The act of regaining certainty from nature marks the last
step of Melville’s quest.
I argue that Melville restores faith through his description of nature and the
metaphor of whaling. These two factors form the basis for Melville’s characters to
negotiate faith. Ishmael and Ahab form the two prevalent approaches to the task: activity
and contemplation. Melville seems to set up an experiment in Moby-Dick. He establishes
two major agents, whom he moves like chess figures over the world map in pursuit of
religious certainty. Ahab represents the active quester while Ishmael’s role throughout the
novel remains that of the contemplative measurer.49 Melville thus has the luxury of
watching his two antipodean questers come face to face with God. Since Ahab represents
the physical act of whaling in the plot, while Ishmael focuses on the theoretical
evaluation of the profession, I will focus on Ahab’s character development to see how his
methodology and faith develop and how Melville’s notions of spiritual uncertainty are
expressed by Hobbes, Spinoza, and Newman.
49
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Ultimately, I suggest that Melville performs a constructive quest rather than a
subversive attack on the zeitgeist of his age, in spite of his negative assessment of nature
and the nature of God. I will analyze how Melville presents the process of attaining
certainty through whaling.

Surface and Deep-Structure
In what may be called his inaugural address to the crew—or more specifically to
Starbuck—Ahab asserts that “all visible objects are but as pasteboard masks” (Melville
140). This description of nature is in keeping with Thomas Hobbes consideration of the
sensations of perception as mere “seeming, or fancy” (9).
Guided by the initial analogy of the pasteboard mask presented by Ahab in the
“Quarter-Deck,” Melville lifts the veil that nature pulls over the eyes of man in multiple
manifestations in the text. The trope of the dichotomy of surface and deep structure is
presented in the portrayal of nature as treacherous and vicious. Directing the reader’s
view at the “tranquil beauty […] of the ocean’s skin,” Melville notes in “The Gilder” that
“one forgets the tiger heart that pants beneath it” (372). Melville hints at the malicious
side of nature being “treacherously hidden beneath the loveliest tints of azure” in
“devilish brilliance and beauty” in the chapter “Brit,” and openly exhibits this brutality in
“The Shark Massacre,” in which the crew witnesses a pack of sharks devour a dead whale
that is tied to the side of the ship (225). Melville describes the unfeeling nature of the
sharks as they “viciously snapped” at the whale’s flesh and even “bit their own” (243).
The creatures thus do not seem to possess restraint. The flesh they tear from the whale
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seems to be “swallowed again and again by the same mouth,” indicating a collective will
that directs the sharks (243). This “Pantheistic vitality,” as Melville suggests, indicates a
volition manifested in nature. Nature is thus merely an expression of the divine will, and
thus enables the individual to draw conclusions about God’s character (243). Melville
thus follows Spinoza’s axiom that “Nature is the power of God,” i.e. an expression of His
will (Spinoza 25). However, Melville develops this thought further in this particular
passage of the text by foreshadowing the concept of the panentheistic Over Soul that
Ralph Waldo Emerson establishes in his essay “Nature.” Melville deals with this issue
extensively, when he depicts nature as an unforgiving force that hides behind the
treacherous veil of the “pitiless sea” (405).
Also in “the Gilder,” Starbuck makes a crucial statement that reflects on
Melville’s quest for certainty. Starbuck notes beholding this treacherous surface that he
wants to forget the “teeth-tiered sharks” that lurk below (373). He wants to “look deep
down and do believe,” meaning that his wish for faith in God’s benevolence outweighs
his compulsion to acknowledge the brutal character of nature that he sees unfurled in the
process of whaling, the sharks’ attack on the whale corpse, and above all in Ahab’s
transgressions against humanity. Despite theses notions, Starbuck exclaims, “Let faith
oust fact,” signifying his decision to ignore the brutality of reality to keep his faith intact.
This scene illustrates clearly how Melville makes nature the platform for a discussion of
faith, and how the divide between the reality of nature and the romanticized notion of
faith are played in the novel. We will see this inner conflict portrayed in more detail in
Ahab’s negotiation of his faith.
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The division between the surface of the sea and the cruelty of the deep, which not
even the fittest can survive, is only breached through the whale; and as the incident with
Pip the cabin boy shows, only the whale can penetrate this barrier without harm. All the
more curious is the scene when the benign mask of nature, represented by the calm sea, is
fractured when Stubb kills his whale. The dying animal rolls over next to the ship “in
blood which bubbled and seethed for furlongs” behind the ship and the whale, creating a
“crimson pond” that “sent back its reflection in every face” on board” the Pequod
(Melville 232). The imagery of the calm water coloring red with an unfeeling sun
shining indifferently upon the bloodbath illustrates the cruel character of nature. The
crew manages to make this cruelty of nature visible through killing the whale, tearing
away the pasteboard mask, if only for an instant.
Equally violent as the process of killing the whale is the process of boiling down
the whale blubber to sperm oil to distill the essence of the whale. The oil is used to fuel
lamps, e.g. to create fire, which symbolizes independence from nature’s arbitrariness. As
we have seen in the discussion of Ahab’s chart, fire in-itself is a religious symbol of
divinity, as can be seen in Moses’ encounter with God (Exodus 3:4ff Douay-Rheims
Version). In Melville’s narrative, however, fire becomes a symbol of human
independence from God, rather than a sign of divine power. In this context, fire
symbolizes mankind’s control over nature. In whaling, Melville thus describes man’s
ascent to power and illustrates his ambition to dominate God. To achieve this end, man
must not tremble before a malignant God that hides behind the “pasteboard mask” (140).
Self-empowerment of “the prisoner” only occurs when he breaks “through the wall” of
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nature that God has built to separate man from God (140). Accordingly, man becomes his
own Prometheus by ripping nature’s secrets from the god-whales bowels. As Walter
Fuller Taylor notes in his article “Melville’s Mythic Power,” in Ahab Melville “fashioned
from his own race and time his own Prometheus” in Ahab (Taylor 178).
If “The Doubloon” chapter presents us with an idea about the contemplative and
analytic faculties that Melville saw in his fellow man, looking at surfaces and deepstructures provides us with an understanding of the obstacles individuals face when trying
to chart their course through existence. In this context, we may be reminded of Reynolds’
evaluation of Melville’s style as the subversive “dark reform mode” (152). Although I
disagree with Reynolds’ overall evaluation of Melville’s mode as merely subversive and
intrinsically hopeless and depressing, it seems clear that Melville steers clear of any form
of euphoria about the fact that he is able to provide his characters with an abundance of
charts on their quest. The turbulent surface-deep-structure-dichotomy relativizes the chart
motif as an anchor of meaning for the characters.
For example, each observer of the doubloon is able to make an initial assessment
of the coin’s value by utilizing a subjective form of chart in reading the coin. However,
the deep-structural symbolic meaning of the coin remains hidden to them as they are
confined by the narrative time of the plot. Accordingly, all of Melville’s characters are
merely able to navigate on the surface structure of the world they inhabit. In fact, Ahab is
the only one who strives to penetrate this veil between reality and providence by the use
of his intuitive chart.50 Arguably he succeeds in transcending reality as he is symbolically
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dragged down into the deep (structure) by the white whale. Ahab’s initial assessment of
the whale’s role in divine providence is correct, as he finds in it the symbol of the barrier
between the natural and the supernatural principle. Melville’s dissection of the whale is a
quasi dissection of the nineteenth-century debate about scriptural interpretation; the
cutting away of the whale’s layers of blubber represents the gradual stripping away of
biblical authority. As Elisa New notes in her essay “Bible Leaves! Bible Leaves!
Hellenism and Hebraism in Melville’s Moby-Dick,” Melville illustrates the pressing issue
of “unification of the disjointed scripture” in the nineteenth century by assessing Ishmael
and Ahab as representatives of opposed textual principles that Melville unites in his novel
(New 288). Melville wrote in an ideological mileu in which God’s communication with
man is, at best, obscured or at its worst completely unintelligible. Melville’s critique of
the Bible, nature, and God in many respects runs counter to the belief in God’s
benevolent nature. Hobbes, Spinoza, and Paine claim that this benevolence can be
detected through the study of nature through science, while Newman states that faith as a
creative faculty has to guide man in his search for God. In contrast, the very faith that
Newman praises represents the object of Melville’s quest. Melville cannot find this
faculty of faith in himself, but it seems as if he cannot trust nature either as the
observations he makes about it only display nature’s cruelty. Thus Melville wishes to
postulate a malignant God who ravages and mocks, reasoning man, of His creation. The
relation of nature to man thus appears to be antagonistic, for Melville expresses this
relationship through the whaling metaphor. As Lewis Mumford notes in “The Fable and
the Myth of the White Whale,” “The whale is Nature, the nature he captures […] a
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Nature that threatens man and calls forth his heroic powers” (169). Nature represented by
the whale “checks the spirit of man”; the whale thus becomes the proctor for man’s test
of the divine will (Mumford in Parker 169). However, the role of the whale in general,
like its token, the doubloon, remains uncertain in and for itself. For example, H. Bruce
Franklin notes in his analysis The Wake of the Gods that Melville postulates “the whale’s
history is as dubious, as equivocal and as mysterious as his divinity” (54). Franklin
observes correctly that the problem with Melville’s presentation of the whale – as with
the doubloon before—does not lie in the lack of attempts to define of the leviathan but
rather in the “many degrees of assertiveness” that Melville presents (Franklin 62). The
leviathan is divine; yet, each new representation of the whale merely reiterates his
divinity, while leaving unclear which divinity it embodies and what its character is.
Franklin defends this notion by claiming that Melville merely “asserts positive doubt.”
The whale to Melville represents the divine, but the story of Moby-Dick merely
underscores the whales’ roles as representative of the divine (55). Divinity is an attribute
that, according to Franklin, limits Moby Dick; “it is to limit, not to extend” the meaning
of the whale as a force of nature (65). Although I do not share Franklin’s hypothesis that
“Moby Dick is the Destroyer” of the Egyptian god Osiris, it seems logical that the
whale’s rendering as divine makes him definite, at least more definite than Ahab’s
classification of the whale him as an “inscrutable thing,” (Franklin 72).
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The Whaling Metaphor
The profession of whaling becomes an elaborate metaphor for the act of
interpreting the metaphysical cipher that the whale poses to its hunter. In describing the
profession of whaling, Ishmael examines every aspect of whales: their behavior, their
genus, the rendering in art, even their physiognomy. Ishmael assumes that “in the internal
parts of the whale, in his anatomy – there at least we should be able to hit the right
classification” and thus arrive at certainty (Melville 120).
In his lengthy “cetology chapters,” Melville uses whaling as a metaphor for his
quest for certainty. The dissection of the whale represents the search for truth and reliable
knowledge about God and His relationship to man. As Franklin notes, “Moby-Dick
reveals, layer by layer the kinds of truth incarnated by the White Whale” (54). In other
words, Melville discusses faith through illustrating the dissection of the whale. Of course,
Melville’s purpose in all of this remains the restoration of certainty through the text. This
restoration, as Melville supposes, occurs when one of his characters finds certainty of
faith. However, faith, as the historical discussion shows, requires conviction rather than
empirical proof.

Faith
Thomas Hobbes begins his discussion of God and faith with a definition of
religion, which he defines religion as the “fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or
imagined from tales publicly allowed” (37). Hobbes goes on to deduce religious
terminology from his first assumptions about human discourse. The term faith represents
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discourse about personal contemplations and is “not so much concerning the thing
[discussed], as the person” and the credibility of that person’s testimony (43). Belief that
is “drawn from [the] authority of men only and their writings; whether they be sent from
God or not, is Faith in men only” (44). Hobbes even expands this rule to scripture when
he declares that “when we believe that the Scriptures are the word of God, having no
immediate revelation from God himself, our belief […] is in the church; whose word we
take and acquiesce therein” (44). Thus Hobbes establishes a strict connection between
statements and their sources, allowing no other authority than that of the source itself and
thus denying both prophets and scripture the agency to express God’s will.51 Making
declarations “in the name of God” therefore becomes impossible within Hobbes’ system,
as these declarations are always purely subjective.
While Hobbes ties the problem of faith to the uncertainty of the authenticity of
divine communication, Benedict de Spinoza identifies the problem of faith as an inherent
part of the human condition. “Inconsistency,” he proclaims in the preface to his
Theologico-Political Treatise (1670) is the reason for social instability, which is why
religion is invested “with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise superior to every
shock” (5). Paradoxically, Spinoza seems to defend the formalized practice of religion,
while simultaneously making a case for free will and against dogma, claiming that
“without freedom, piety cannot flourish” (6). Spinoza’s tone seems diplomatic and
anxious not to offend, even though the results of his analyses could not be more
revolutionary for his time. He clearly breaks out of the deterministic confines of the
51

For a discussion of scriptural authority and the reliability of prophetic testimony, see
chapter II.
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Calvinism, and grants man a free will and thereby power over his own fate. However,
Spinoza finds in human “minds also the mind of God and His eternal thoughts […]
impressed” (24). He thus postulates a divine connection between mankind and God,
while deviating from the concept of human depravity. Spinoza’s concept of certainty of
faith thus imposes a double standard on man’s capacity to know the true nature of God.
Man can only obtain knowledge about God through his own independent reason.
However, his mind is merely an imprint in miniature of the divine mind of God. Thus one
may argue that any knowledge that the human mind conceives of is merely discovered
because of the human mind’s similarity to the divine mind of God. Spinoza confirms that
man has to use the mental faculties within him in order to arrive at certainty. He would
therefore argue that Melville were justified in his whaling analogy for the search for
certainty. However, while Spinoza’s Arminian axiom of free will may confirm Melville’s
methodology, Spinoza’s comment on the origin of the human mind denies the possibility
of man ever attaining certain knowledge about God. If God made man but a miniature
copy of Himself, it seems logical that the faculties of this copy may not carry the
individual to a state of knowledge that can rival the original. Thus while Spinoza would
deem Melville’s quest a noble display of human inquisitiveness, he would still rule out
that Melville’s quest could push certainty beyond the quester’s reach. To be entirely
certain of God’s existence, man would have to think like God and thus become God. The
quester would thus have to become the very thing that he quests for. Melville realizes this
inherent contradiction that Spinoza delineates in his Treatise, and therefore makes Ahab a
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central character. Ahab is the embodiment of unrelenting activity. Ahab’s unrelenting
zeal does not accept any boundaries, a predicament that ultimately leads to his demise.
John Henry Newman is much more positivistic than either Spinoza or Melville
could be in man’s ability to attain certainty. Newman seems to second the notion that
questing can lead to certainty, when he proclaims that “we must assume something to
prove anything, and can gain nothing without venture” (215). Newman thus encourages
the first step of the quest, which in Melville’s case is the assumption that there is
objective truth and certainty that can be unraveled through the act of questing. Newman
declares that the motivation for such first assumptions, and thus the motivation for the
active pursuit of their logical conclusions, forms the basis of faith. Beyond that, Newman
states that faith uses “a method […] less open to analysis” than reason, and is therefore
more prone to provide divine truths as it “rises above Reason in its subject matter” (216).
Thus faith is a kind of reason, but one in which “much of the grounds of inference cannot
be exhibited” (218). The tools by which faith provides insight are not fully assessable by
the human understanding. Like Spinoza before him, Newman thus claims that human
understanding has a naturally imposed limit. However, while Melville sees limitation as a
challenge, an attitude that he expresses through the character Ahab, Newman renders this
limit a positive aspect of the human mind. Faith is a mental faculty that resists empirical
analysis; therefore, its potential for being of use on a quest for certainty cannot be
rendered accurately either. For individuals that manage to tap into their potential for faith,
faith is limitless and grants confidence and certainty. Thus Newman sees faith as a
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positive, albeit dormant, aspect of the human mind that has to be activated in order to be
of service to the individual.
This process of activating one’s faith, according to Newman, requires courage,
and the individual brave enough to have faith follows the pattern of activity that is
already suggested by his senses. Melville seemingly agrees when he writes that Ishmael
seeks to exorcize the “November” (18) in his soul, meaning that which Newman calls
“that cold, skeptical, critical tone of mind, which has no inward sense of […] Providence,
no desire to approach its God” (220). Through Ishmael then, Melville embarks on a quest
for God rather than sitting “at home waiting for the fearful clearness of His coming”
(Newman 220, 221). However, Melville does not feel the inner warmth of faith that
Newman promises, a disappointment that manifests itself in Ahab’s rage. In her study
The Pusher and the Sufferer, Suzanne Stein describes Melville’s hate as a rage directed at
“a god he conceives as dictatorial, calculating” (19). Meanwhile, Newman would praise
the mere fact that Melville ventures to write a book and thus dares to quest for certainty
rather than to be stifled by religious doubt, and praise what Stein calls a “fear of staying
still” as a positive incentive of activity (Stein 19). Melville’s constructive defiance thus
finds support in Newman’s assessment of faith as a creative faculty of the human mind. If
nothing else, the activity of questing presupposes the hope of finding something else.
From Newman’s perspective, one can argue that Melville would never have started
Moby-Dick if he had not believed that his faith could be salvaged through his creative
effort.
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In Sermon X, which he preached on the morning of Epiphany in 1839, Newman
exemplifies the contrast between faith and reason. He bases his discourse on the Bible
quote from the Epistle of St. Paul to the Hebrews which defines faith as “the substance of
things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb 11:1, Douay-Rheims
Version). Newman claims that “faith is an instrument of knowledge and action […], a
principle sui generis, distinct from those which nature supplies and in particular […]
independent of […] Reason” (179). Faith, as Newman claims, is not merely a weak form
of reason, but a “creative power” of the human mind and therefore “something higher
than Reason” (Newman 180, 183). Faith is the sum of “feelings not natural to fallen
man”; i.e. the impulse of seeking God comes to man “only of supernatural grace” (193).
Newman thus postulates that the human capacity to seek moral concepts outside of
himself already functions as proof for the divine character of faith, if not for the existence
of God.
Newman also establishes a relation between testimony and faith on the one side,
and experience and reason on the other side while acknowledging that “Reason is our
ultimate informant concerning all knowledge” (181). Like Paine and Spinoza, Newman
seems to propose for the individual to exercise prudence when making decisions relating
to faith. “Faith is actually grounded on Reason” and acts of faith may “be justified, by
Reason, without therefore being […] dependent on it” (Newman 183). He retraces the
general assessment of faith as weak reason back to the fact that “Faith is content with
weaker evidence” (185). While faith still requires evidence, its creative nature compels
the individual to make a decision without having empirical evidence to judge the object
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of that decision. Faith is in so far volitional “easiness […] of conviction” as the individual
can either believe or not believe in light of the absence of evidence (187).
Newman admits that “Faith is influenced by previous notices, prepossessions, and
[…] prejudices” and thus implies that the individual can never be entirely certain whether
their actions are truly inspired by faith or merely their socialization (187). However, faith
has practical assets as it does not require “diligent collection of evidence” and “balancing
of rival testimony”; on the contrary, faith to Newman represents a “principle of multitude
and for conduct” (Newman 188). As a creative power, faith represents the realization of
hope: “it is the reckoning that to be, which it hopes to be” (190). Faith, it seems to
Newman, is less “Religious Truth” than a commitment to accept certain facts that are not
“the result of an argument” (199, 198).
Newman would thus appreciate Melville’s quest for certainty in Moby-Dick as the
impulse for such a quest to him already communicates certainty of faith. Unfortunately,
in Newman’s ideology, Melville falls short of attaining faith through his methodology.
The chapter “The Doubloon” illustrates how Melville tries to resolve uncertainty by
argumentation and interpretation. Even if we argue that Melville celebrates the
multiplicity of perspectives in his doubloon chapter Melville would still fail to attain faith
under Newman’s definition of the term, because faith does not stand at the end of a chain
of reasoning but represents a conscious decision to believe. If Melville has to convince
himself of the strength of faith before he applies it, his analysis cannot bring forth
spiritual certainty.
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Above all, a comparison between Newman with Melville’s methodology
illustrates a fundamental flaw in Melville’s methodology in his quest for certainty.
Melville seeks knowledge that is of the category of empirical certainty while expecting
this knowledge to provide him with the same emotional rewards that faith would supply.
Melville cannot follow Newman’s simplistic advice to just decide to believe because his
disposition is investigative. To return to the example of the doubloon, the fact that
Melville does present the doubloon as an interpretative prism already disqualifies him to
obtain the form of unconditional faith that he wishes to obtain.52 One could thus argue
that Melville’s demands on faith are too high, as faith entails a willingness of the
individual to belief its doctrines without proof that is of the same nature as empirical
evidence. In essence, Melville attempts to attain spiritual knowledge that is of the same
category of reliability as empirical knowledge, arguably an impossible endeavor.
However, the term “faith” itself is subjective and thus cannot provide a resolution to the
general state of uncertainty that Melville identifies in his age.
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Ironically, Newman was accused of having no real faith because of his superior ability
to apply logic in his arguments. Newman (like Melville) found himself in a spiritual crisis
towards the end of his career and struggled to regain his faith after having been pressured
out of his Office as Minister at Oxford by the Protestant Orthodoxy who did not approve
his attempt at a via media between Protestantism and Catholic doctrine. For more details
see especially chapter IV, “History of My Religious Opinions from 1841 to 1845,” in
Apologia Pro Vita Sua (1865).

82

Ahab
The attribute of divinity in the leviathan, is discussed in Ishmael’s account of
cetology, is enacted by Ahab in particular, who sees himself as a godlike agent of fate. In
this Melville already illustrates the dichotomy between activity and passiveness in the
two characters. In her essay “Bible Leaves! Bible Leaves!” (1998) Elisa New establishes
that Ahab is the history-altering force of Christian historicism, while Ishmael represents
Judaism’s contemplative recording. Accordingly, Ahab becomes the driving force in the
plot, the physical quest for certainty. He embodies the profession of whaling as it
metaphorically dissects the god-whale in order to arrive at certainty. Thus a closer look at
Ahab’s character will shed light on Melville’s philosophy of activity in his quest.
Ahab‘s quest is not merely a quest for vengeance; his revenge for his physical
dismemberment does not lie in the killing of the whale, but rather in a pursuit that is as
relentless and deterministic as he makes the whale out to be. Considering himself
“madness maddened,” Ahab presumably becomes like the unknown force that drives the
white whale: indifferent and above human sentiment (Melville 143). Suzanne Stein
agrees with Melville’s implication that Ahab “in a fundamental sense, does not feel”;
“not his misery and little else” (16). However, she claims that Ahab does not undergo any
development in the novel, “remaining in the same state of misery at the end of the novel
as he was at the beginning,” and that Ahab sees himself as the fated agent of God from
the very beginning (16). It is this emotional emptiness that elevates Ahab above the rest
of the crew, making him, according to Stein, godlike. I disagree with this assessment, for
the simple reason that Ahab repeatedly stresses the strength of his will before he enters
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into the introspective last conversation with Starbuck in second day of “The Chase,” in
which Ahab arrives at his epiphany that he is “Fates’ lieutenant” (418). It is the physical
pain of dismemberment that motivates him and the psychological pain of alienation form
society that causes Ahab’s intense melancholy.
Ultimately, Ahab seeks to render the unknown harmless by killing the white
whale; if he can catch the beast and kill it, he will make his faceless fear tangible. Ahab
seeks to meet the god that lurks behind the mask of the whale on eye-level. However,
Ahab’s transgression against his humanity is a tool, a strategy to approximate his will to
that which he beholds operating through the white whale. Contrary to Stein’s claim, I
argue that Ahab does indeed feel himself. In fact, Ahab’s emotions are important to
Melville’s quest, as Ahab represents a vital part of Melville’s strategy to obtain certainty.
Without his deep passions, Ahab would not be of use to Melville, because whatever
degree of certainty Ahab may attain could not be vicariously experienced, either by
Melville or any other reader of the novel. It is therefore crucial that Ahab does not
become emotionless and thus, as Stein would have it, divine. Ahab is obsessed with the
mechanisms that drive divine agents on earth because ultimately, he realizes that he is
himself such an agent. But his inner transformation proceeds gradually in a way that the
reader –and the author—may emulate to attain the same metamorphosis. Melville is
interested to explore and at the same time demonstrate what kind of transgression against
human nature is necessary in order to obtain certainty about the divine.
Ahab sees his own will opposed, not to the will of the white whale but to that of
the puppet master that pulls the strings of the leviathan. According to Ahab’s statements
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in “The Quarter-Deck,” the whale challenges him not because he bit his leg off but
because the whale represents merely a contraption, a facade that hides the face of the
divine principle that tasks Ahab to come and seek out the true character of the divine. To
Ahab, the whale is not just an abstract supernatural hieroglyph for the existence of the
divine, but a physical gateway through which this supernatural force becomes tangible
for Ahab. He pursues his quest with this awareness of opposition and invests real emotion
into his pursuit. It is this emotional display that makes Ahab valuable to Melville in his
quest for certainty. If Ahab were as unfeeling as the divine principle he pursues,
identification with the character would be impossible. For Melville the quest would be
lost and whatever evidentiary certainty Ahab would attain would be worthless to
Melville, as this certainty produced by an inhuman methodology. If Ahab, as Suzanne
Stein would have it, was unfeeling throughout the novel, his evolution from a free-willing
Arminian to deterministic Calvinist, would seem less dramatic. This loss of individuality,
resulting from the realization that his course in life is in fact predetermined, would seem
less shocking if Ahab did not have a final bit of humanity to lose. In fact, Melville
justifies Ahab’s decision to turn his back on civilization when Ishmael claims “what are
the comprehensible terrors of man compared with the interlinked terrors and wonders of
God.” (98).Without Ahab’s repeated introspection, Melville would not be able to identify
with his fictional alter ego. The reader would be indifferent to Ahab’s transgressions
against humanity. Maintaining a distinction between human and divine characters thus is
essential for Melville’s narrative technique.
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Ahab and Calvinism
As Ahab becomes the ultimate agent of determinism, Melville incorporates
Calvinist elements in Moby-Dick. The bleak outlook Calvinism takes on the nature of
mankind correlates to several aspects of Ahab’s character profile. According to the
concept of total depravity, the foremost principle of the five points of Calvinism, human
beings are unfit to make innately good and moral decisions because they are subjected to
sin from birth. 53 All that appears good in mankind is really decreed by God. Humans can
thus never return to the state before the original sin, in which they had blind
unquestioning faith in God. Accordingly, Ahab enters the world of the open sea tainted
and marked by sin. He bears several marks of divine encounters on his body: the
crucifixion that marks his entire body and the leg he lost in his encounter with the white
whale. To Ahab, these are physical signs that he has been in contact with a divine entity.
For if God can smite him, Ahab’s reason dictates that he might strike out against his
punisher as well. Ahab considers himself an equal to the unseen divine principle that he
fathoms behind nature. 54 Ahab wears his scars as a badge of his divine encounter, and as
physical evidence of arbitrary “God-bullying,” as Gary Sloan notes in his essay “MobyDick Broiled in Hell Fire” (64).
Another central factor in Calvinism that relates to the plot of Moby-Dick consists
of the individual’s ignorance to his own salvation. A person whom God has chosen for
53

“Man, by his fall into a state of sin, has wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good
accompanying salvation: so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good, and
dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself
thereunto. ” The Westminster Confession of Faith (1648), Chapter IX: “Of Free Will,” p.
2, 3ff.
54
“Who is over me?” (Melville 140).
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salvation might as well be a noble king as he might be a humble thief. Significantly,
Ahab however reads the signs on his body as marks of divine election. He is quite sure of
his instrumental role in the plot and thus assumes that he has been chosen to encounter
God face to face. One may thus see Ahab as a typological Moses. Indeed, Melville’s
allusions to the biblical King Ahab support, as Franklin points out, the notion that Ahab
embodies the type of the “priest-king god,” just as Moby Dick is the eternal destroyer
(74). However, Ahab binds the will of his crew not because he has been charged by God
to do so, but because he needs their skills to pursue his monomaniac quest. Ahab has no
reverence for community or what may be called the common good. Other than the
biblical figure Moses, the end of Ahab’s quest, in its Arminian state, does not entail
social change but a private satisfaction. It is only in the second “The Chase” chapter that
Ahab turns to determinism and begins to see himself as part of a cosmic whole. Quite
contrary to Moses though, even as a Calvinist Ahab—in un-Mosaic fashion—remains
focused on his role in the divine plot and does not care for the fate of his charges, the
crew. However, Ahab’s attitude is in keeping with Calvin’s teachings. Calvin postulates
that God selects certain individuals from the fallen race of mankind into heaven,
pardoning their original sin by limited atonement. However, according to the principle of
irresistible grace, the selected person cannot influence this divine providence. A person
may thus not be selected on the basis of faith or virtue but by God’s arbitrary choosing.
Calvinism thus confirms the sovereignty and supreme authority of God and
underscores the total dependence of the individual on God. Ironically, Ahab comes to this
realization in his final conversation with Starbuck in the chapter “The Symphony.” Ahab
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doubts his independent agency when Starbuck prophetically bids him to “fly these deadly
waters” (Melville 406). For the first time, Ahab considers the inevitability of his pursuit
of the white whale. Like Starbuck he feels the “natural lovings and longings” that make
him want to return to his family (Melville 406). However, his zeal to kill the whale is
stronger than his urge to embrace his loved ones. Melville here displays Ahab’s tragic
flaw, as the captain is emotionally unable to accept the human redemption offered to him
by Starbuck. The second in command offers Ahab the consolation of a “human eye”
which to Ahab becomes “a magic glass” that shows him his family one last time before
he encounters his doom (Melville 406). Ahab has chosen to cast his humanity aside and
to accept the fatedness of his existence. Ahab realizes his role in the greater context of a
cosmic theater; he also rejects Starbucks plea to return to humanity and his family.
Ahab’s sin is not his quest for the whale, but his decision to abandon society because he
feels “deadly faint, bowed, and humped” (Melville 406). This, I argue is the fundamental
flaw that Melville shows in Ahab’s actions and death.
Ahab’s persona is literally iconoclastic as he strives to “strike through the mask”
at the reasoning, “inscrutable thing” behind it (Melville 140). However, Ahab firmly
believes his quest will lead him to the hostile force behind the curtain. If there were
indeed “naught beyond” (Melville 140), Ahab would strike out in vain against a “dumb
brute” (Melville 139) as Starbuck initially suggest. But his quest to reveal the intelligence
behind the whale appears to be based on the assumption that something must exist behind
the mask.
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Ironically, Ahab’s quest is to detect the “hidden lord and master” (Melville 406)
that guides both his actions and the actions of the whale. In the course of his quest, Ahab
negotiates his volition and grows increasingly unsure whether he possesses free will. In
one of his final dialogs with Starbuck, the captain inadvertently enumerates the three
entities that can possibly determine his actions when he asks, “Is it I, God, or who that
lifts this arm?” (Melville 406). Ahab’s question might prove worthy of closer
examination: Previously Ahab had considered himself the master of his own fate because
he is endowed with free will and can thus volitionally chose to rebel against God. The
pronoun “I” represents this position in his question. However as he feels compelled to act
against his natural urge to return to his family, Ahab begins to dispute his unrestricted
personal agency. Eventually he comes to realize that it is indeed God who determines his
fate and finally embraces God’s supernatural authority over his actions. Interestingly,
Ahab’s new-found devotion to the divinity amplifies his zeal to slay the whale, i.e. to
fulfill his purpose,55 because Ahab’s mental transformation, the whale appears like a
fellow actor in a play that was “rehearsed” for “a billion years" before their present
existence, as Ahab defines existence in his dialog with Starbuck in the chapter “The
Chase – Second Day” (Melville 418).
One might wonder whether Ahab acts out of Calvinist conviction or whether his
sudden religious devotion is merely an argumentative charade. The eloquence,
calculating zeal, and experience he demonstrates throughout the voyage attest to the latter
conclusion. However Ahab also demonstrates a nihilistic fear early in the plot, which lies
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One may also note that, as a Zoroastrian, Ahab worships his god through defiance.
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at the very heart of his existence. Ahab’s change of heart in the matter of faith becomes
understandable if one considers the third part of his rhetorical question: if neither Ahab
nor God directs Ahab’s action, “who” does? The question remains unanswered. Only the
unknown divine principle or the human mind may control a person’s actions. Had Ahab
chosen the third and more indefinite option of “who,” he would have acknowledged that
his own existence and motivations are incomprehensible to him. In the absence of
meaning, he might have faced the dreaded “naught beyond” that may lurk behind the
mask of divinity (Melville 140). As “every probability” to Ahab is the “next thing to a
certainty,” he considers this fear very seriously (Melville 168). Accordingly the only
concept that Ahab could derive from the relative pronoun “who” would be constant
doubt, i.e. uncertainty in its most extreme form. With doubt being the only constant, and
the ultimate expression of instability, Ahab’s existence would become void of purpose, as
“some certain significance lurks in all things, else all things are little worth” (Melville
331). Indeed, the world would be an “empty cipher,” which is the only solution to the
question of purpose and therefore the meaning of life, that is unacceptable to both
Ishmael and Ahab in the text (Melville 331). After all it is the “inscrutable thing” that he
despises (Melville 140).
The evil that Ahab battles is really a void of meaning. However, as R.E. Watters
notes in “Melville’s Metaphysics of Evil” from 1940, Ahab creates this evil himself when
he places “himself as the centre of all reality” and thus creates a “polarity between good
and evil” after which “he seeks an intelligible explanation of this great dichotomy,”
which he created (Watters qtd. in Parker 183). Ahab poses as a thinking spiritual being at
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one end of an equation that he tries to balance by investing meaning into an apparently
supernatural occurrence, the white whale. It is therefore necessary for Ahab’s mentality
that there is meaning behind his physical dismemberment and the whale holds a truth and
intelligence that is bigger than his physical appearance. Ahab thus projects the meaning
of his own existence into the whale. Accordingly, Watters suggests that Ahab, and
consequently Melville, create the very problem which they seek to solve.
Ahab’s inability to lead a constructive life, to return to his wife and child, and to
embrace the duties that the family community charges him with, leave him bound to the
task of slaying the whale who symbolizes this inability to feel at home in the community.
Ahab’s rendering of the whale as his personal nemesis by divine decree would be merely
a result of Ahab’s lack of social skills. Watter’s assumption also concurs with Ahab’s
Arminian mindset early on in the plot, as Watters presupposes a free will in man.
However, Ahab’s conversion to Calvinism negates Watter’s interpretation. Before his
final confrontation with the whale, Ahab no longer presumes that he has a choice to fight
the whale or return to his family. On the contrary, Ahab assumes that his very existence is
based on encountering the beast which, of course, irrevocably precipitates his doom.
Ahab has no choice but to accept the role of being “Fates’ lieutenant,” because in
this way only does his life’s quest attain meaning (Melville 418). After this final act of
self-recognition, “Ahab is for ever Ahab,” meaning that he embraces Calvinist
determinism and the fate allotted to him (Melville 418). By claiming that his role in life
was prescribed unto him “a billion years before this ocean rolled,” Ahab constructs his
own mythical origin and assumes his place in a deterministic universe (Melville 418). In
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that respect, Ahab receives that which he thought to have possessed all along: purpose.
However, he realizes that his role is not to fight “a God who is a brutal monster,” as
Walter Herbert assumes, but to encounter the whale as an equal, divine agent (1613). The
animal is similar to Ahab in that its fate is also controlled by God with the difference that
Ahab is to perish in the encounter. Ultimately, it is irrelevant who leaves the battlefield
victoriously. The only important factor seems to be that the grand deterministic cosmic
clockwork keeps running.
Ahab’s mental evolution throughout the plot illustrates that he ultimately does not
battle the whale and what lurks behind it, but he rather seeks to negate the possibility that
there exists no meaning behind nature. His ultimate motivation for questing consists in
the fear of discovering that existence is void of meaning. Insofar, Ahab succeeds in his
quest. His death is not in vain, as he valiantly battles the monster and perishes in the
attempt.
With the character Ahab, Herman Melville arguably creates a personified case
study of the state of the religious mind in the nineteenth century, and of his personal
quest for religious certainty. Throughout the novel, Ahab evolves from a free-willing
Arminian who sets out to take revenge on God and ascend to his level, to a fatalist who
fully embraces the Calvinist concept of determinism. One might argue that Ahab, as a
fictional character, is pursuing the author as his creator and thus becomes the figure on
the board that is most directly connected to Melville. If this thought is brought to its
logical conclusion Melville’s quest may be thus resolved: if the fictional character Ahab

92

can strike out against the God who inscrutably weaves on the loom of fate behind the
narrative’s reality Melville will perhaps be able to find certainty as well.

Ishmael
As Ahab quests to obtain certainty by physically encountering the whale, Ishmael
dissects the concept of the whale in the cetology chapters. Ishmael’s enthusiastic
statement “I want to know what whaling is. I want to see the world,” to Captain Peleg’s
question as to why the young man wants to go whaling, introduces one of Melville’s
primary metaphors in the text: whaling as a means to arrive at certainty about the
existence of God. Melville establishes that the whale is a metaphor of divine meaning, i.e.
certainty. Ishmael initially does not state that he wants to kill a whale and fight him to the
death; he wants to see and know him. In this context, knowing the whale must be read as
understanding the whale. This term incorporates Emerson’s distinction of tuition and
intuition at the same time. Ishmael hopes to learn about the divine nature of the whale by
studying the whale from every angle imaginable. Therefore, Ishmael represents the
empiricist in Melville’s quest for certainty. His role is contemplative and less dramatic
than Ahab’s; however, his goal is the same, to obtain certainty about the existence of the
divinity.
Melville acknowledges empirical science as one among several charts on his
quest for certainty. This acknowledgement is uttered by Ishmael, who introduces his
pseudo-scientific whaler’s perspective into the narrative. In “A Bower in the Arsacides,”
as well as in the subsequent chapters “Measurement of the Whale’s Skeleton,” “The
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Fossil Whale,” and “Does the Whale’s Magnitude Diminish? – Will He Perish,” Ishmael
accommodates empirical knowledge about sperm whales and combines it with biblical
and pagan accounts that render whales as immortal godlike creatures. He discusses the
possibility of sperm whales decreasing in size and eventually perishing. When
elaborating on the perishing of whales in the periphery of the temple of Denderah in
Upper Egypt, the speaker renders the whaler as a religious person who is not a member of
the “common people” (Melville 351). The Nantucket whaler becomes Melville’s critical
measuring rod for scientific and mystical explanations of the whale. The whaler does not
take “a Whale’s Rib of an incredible length for a Miracle” because he has seen the animal
first hand and has boiled down blubber of whales of different sizes (351). However, a
whaler will still “silently worship” the majesty of the mysterious animal at Denderah
(351). Melville thus illustrates the tension between science and spirituality within the
whaler in his attempt to explain the pedigree of the Leviathan, which dates back to a
“wondrous period, ere time itself can be set to have begun; for time began with man”
(350).
Nowhere in Moby-Dick does Melville express the expectation that his age
employs empiricism as the ultimate means to certainty more clearly than in the chapter
“A Bower in the Arsacides.” There, Ishmael conducts measurements on a whale skeleton
with his “green measuring-rod” that the native priests of the island deem holy (346).
Ironically, the priests quarrel amongst one other about the official measurements of their
God, admonishing Ishmael “How now! […] darest thou measure this our God! That’s for
us” (346). Melville makes a practical joke against doctrine in this encounter of Ishmael
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and the priests. The priests, who are the interpreters of the divine will, cannot decide
among themselves what the correct physical measurement of their God is. They thus
admit their inability to provide precise and reliable interpretation of the will of the deity,
which, as I have demonstrated in my discussion of prophets,56 should be the foremost
duty of their profession. Instead of waiting for the priests of his time to agree on how to
read God’s reflection in nature, Ishmael measures the whalebones with a stick he carved.
Ishmael seemingly mocks church authority by making his own measurements on the
God. At the same time, he simplifies Melville’s quest for spiritual certainty by implying
that all it takes to fully understand a deity is to measure its earthly form. Ironically, the
priests support this notion by confusing the physical measuring of the god with the
metaphysical measuring of his power. Thus Ishmael merely performs pseudo science and
refutes the concept of the “open-ended universe,” which Charles Darwin would make
popular in the middle of the nineteenth century (Hovenkamp 200).
Ishmael realizes later on in his narrative that his attempt at defining the whale is
futile, since neither approach describes the leviathan exhaustively. Ishmael looks to the
Bible to find equals in age to the mystical leviathan; however, even “Methusela seems a
schoolboy” because “Ahab’s harpoon had shed older blood than the Pharaos’” (Melville
350). As Ishmael seeks to “look at his matter from every light” (352) his rendering of the
sperm whale is twofold. On the one hand, he accounts for the whales’ mythological
origin and its “unsourced existence,” thereby reestablishing Ahab’s fear of the great
empty cipher of existence (350). For if the whale has no beginning in time and has
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See chapter II.
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ubiquity in space, it is, by definition, a god. However the term “God,” already entails a
certainty by definition that does not apply to the whale. Ishmael demonstrates that the
whale resists any attempt to define and thus limit it, be it theoretically by Ishmael or
physically by Ahab. On the other hand, Ishmael grounds his investigation in the
practicality of whaling by answering his rhetorical questions from the perspective of a
whaler, not a cleric or church historian. However, Ishmael never directly engages the
whale. He is employed in dissecting the dead animal, which has already had the life force
driven out of it. Unfortunately, the whale in its dissected form cannot reveal any “secret
thing that is in” it, as the soul that formerly dwelled in it has been driven out in the battle
with the crew, as Ahab demonstrates when he commands the whale’s “vast and venerable
head” to speak in “The Sphynx” (Melville 249). Ishmael thus finds himself grounded by
his own inactivity. His knowledge about the species of the whale grants him
contemplative power over the whale as a concept but he lacks the will to action
physically to encounter the whale. By the same token, Ahab possesses the iron will to
fight the whale to the death, but does not posses the theoretic knowledge to make sense of
its philosophical implications. Ahab’s soliloquy about his role in the divine comedy of
the fight between him and the whale demonstrates that his activity has given him riddles
which he is unable to decipher.
Ishmael does not face this uncertainty of his own identity because he remains
caught up in the daily duties of a sailor’s life. The community with the other sailors keeps
him form questioning his role in the quest for the whale, as he concentrates his
contemplative powers on the rest of the crew. In “A Squeeze of the Hand,” Ishmael feels
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“divinely free from all ill-will”; as he squeezes his “co-laborers’ hands,” he finds himself
overcome by an “affectionate, friendly, loving feeling” of community (Melville 323).
This overemphasis of community underscores that while Ishmael does not find out about
the nature of the whale, or God, he finds the consolation of community and friendship,
which ultimately dispatches the November from his soul. In contrast, Ahab rejects
Starbuck’s suggestion to return to his family. Starbuck manages to divert Ahab’s
monomaniacal view, even if only for a few moments, back to civilization and
communion with his race and away from “the desolation and solitude” that his life has
been (405).57 Accordingly, Melville proposes that community as a saving aspect of
human existence. The state of community allows the individual to rest in the luxury of
inactivity.
This state of complacency created by community becomes apparent when Ishmael
renders the whale “immortal in his species, however perishable in his individuality”
(Melville 350). The leviathan thus being indefinable attains a dual definition. The whale
“having been before all time, must needs exist after all human ages are over” (354). The
word choice in this passage suggests a fusion of empirical science and scriptural
accounts. Ishmael thus advocates a methodology of reconciliation between science and
religion that exhibits the nineteenth century attitude that “knowledge about God and
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Interestingly, Hawthorne paints a different picture when he addresses communion of
the human race in “Young Goodman Brown.” A communion that is formed in the
wilderness – in Hawthorne’s forest and on Melville’s seven seas– represents a satanic
bond of conspiracy against virtue and God. Hawthorne describes how Brown is forever
embittered from seeing his whole village (his community) worship the devil in the forest,
while Melville has Ishmael survive to tell the tale, because Ishmael has learned to
appreciate community and friendship
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knowledge about the world are of the same kind” (Bacon qtd. in Hovenkamp 23).
Ishmael accepts this dualism and at the same time validates an ambiguity in the
definition, as the whale cannot be both immortal and mortal. Whether it is Starbuck’s
faith, Pip’s insanity, Queequeg’s cosmology, or Ahab’s monomania, every member of the
crew ultimately perishes in using his strategic chart while pursuing a single dimensional
certainty. Ishmael presents the exception to this rule: He accepts the boundaries nature
sets, abandons his measuring of the god, and finds himself spared from the fate of those
who follow Ahab beyond the limits of human knowledge.
Ironically, Melville seems to suggest that one must be willing to put existence on
the line to uncover its hidden meaning. Community might provide happiness; however, it
does not grant the category of certainty that is equal to empirical knowledge. As
Hovenkamp notes, “Americans want[ed] to know what they believe[d],” meaning that
Americans, including Melville, craved a faith made certain by scientific proof (78).
Ultimately, Melville answers his question about the one true nature of existence by
demonstrating the ramifications of the human willingness and capacity for change. In
order to render the unknown harmless, to chart the inexplicable, Melville seems to
believe that one must evolve beyond natural and mental limitations. In the most extreme
extension of this doctrine, the quester must be willing to either choose blind faith or
extinction.
Nevertheless, it seems certain to me, even though this term shall not be used
recklessly, that Melville quests with the explicit purpose of finding certainty rather than
merely creating a void of hopelessness. It appears to me that Melville seeks what
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Newman calls “certitude,” i.e. “a habit of mind […] that might equal in measure and
strength the certitude […] created by the strictest scientific demonstration” (Apologia
29).58 Melville approaches this challenging task with creativity and an eager mind in his
novel and does not exclude any form of questing that might lead to the form of certainty
he desires to find. Thus, I fail to recognize his alleged appetite for subversive quibbles to
stress the spiritual shortcomings of his age, which Reynolds suggests in Beneath the
American Renaissance. In The Wake of the Gods, Franklin follows the same notion about
the constructive nature of Melville’s endeavor in his discussion of myths. Franklin claims
that Melville “destructively attacks religious and mythological orthodoxy and more
constructively creates a new myth” (54). Melville’s subversion of faith, as we see it
unfold in Ahab and Starbuck, breeds creation as his narrative accomplishes at the very
least a rendering of what can be considered certain, if not its original goal of providing
new certainty in an age without faith.

58

Newman distinguishes certitude as a “habit of mind” from certainty, as a ”quality of
propositions” (Apologia 29). Certainty, according to Newman, thus is always the result of
evaluating data, while certitude is the conscious decision to believe in this data, i.e. a
conviction.
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V. CONCLUSION
Melville’s assessment of the problem of certainty in his time as well as the literary
tradition of spiritual doubt in which he wrote is as multifaceted as the doubloon itself. He
invents the process of charting with which his characters seek to penetrate the veil of
uncertainty in nature and in their own spiritual disposition. Ultimately, Melville’s quest
for certainty does not appear to answer his question for absolute empirical certainty about
God. His quest rather manages to establish that empirical knowledge of God is
unattainable simply because faith in God is a creative faculty that cannot be derived from
empirical data. Throughout my discussion of uncertainty in Moby-Dick, I have shown
that Melville writes in a literary tradition of spiritual doubt with its roots in the
seventeenth century. Although not having explicitly consulted these texts, the ideas of
Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Thomas Paine, and John Henry Newman
formed the zeitgeist of Melville’s age.
I have argued that Melville primarily constructs a dichotomy between Ahab’s and
Ishmael’s methodology in the novel, reestablishing what Spinoza suggests two hundred
years earlier in his Theologico-Political Treatise, namely that God only expresses his
nature in absolute and exclusive forms, such as life and death and activity and passivity.
While Ahab perishes, Ishmael lives to tell the tale. While Ishmael’s friend Queequeg
dies, Ishmael survives by clinging to his friend’s casket.
We have also seen through the analysis in the previous chapters, that nature
expresses an unseen will with brutality and absolute force and dominance that symbolizes
the barrier of human contemplative faculties. It is a barrier that neither Ahab nor Ishmael
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can penetrate. Accordingly, Melville does not give prevalence to either approach in the
text. Indeed, Melville’s concept to attain certainty is more complex then to sit back and
study his characters’ quest, while hoping to be able to form a hierarchy of methodology
based on which character survives the battle with the whale. Melville rather suggests that
the various characters of Moby-Dick each have assets that one should draw upon in one’s
individual quest for certainty.
On the one hand, a life of zealous pursuit, as depicted by Ahab, inflamed by the
monomaniac focus on attaining one static truth, will inevitably lead to destruction. On the
other hand, a life spent in continuous scientific curiosity and with a focus on community
with other human beings leads to a perpetual quest of learning, a journey that has many
possible routes and intersections, but never yields practical certainty. Even though
Melville presents Ishmael as an empiricist in “A Bower in the Arsacides,” his
investigation takes a back seat to his need for community. We see this in his friendship
with Queequeg, but also in chapters like “A Squeeze of the Hand,” or “The Tryworks.”
Ishmael does not sacrifice his need for community, for obtaining absolute certainty.
Arguably, Ishmael lives because he chooses life, a life led in the midst of his fellow men,
rather than striving for a literally single goal.
Herman Melville thus presents two solutions to the problem of uncertainty in
Moby-Dick: activity and contemplation. Activity and monomania, as we have seen before
are represented in Ahab, while Ishmael embodies contemplation and community.
However, both concepts exist side by side in the novel and form a hybrid mode of action
that Melville suggests the reader should adopt. I argue that Melville does pan moral
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judgment in favor of one or the other method. As I have shown before, it is the
unbreakable will of Ahab that draws Melville to the character. As Anne Baker notes,
“Melville is fascinated by Ahab’s mental processes” and thus does not simply kill off the
zealous captain to demonstrate tragic irony or a sense of moral victory of humanity over
delusion of divinity (193). Melville’s concern with the character Ahab goes further.
Similar to how “Ahab’s obsession with finding Moby Dick is ‘marking’ his mind,”
Melville’s mind is marked with the obsession to prove that certainty is a tangible concept
and that there is indeed a mode of living which invokes the will’s ascent to spiritual
certainty (Melville 167). Melville is fascinated with Ahab’s unbreakable will and activity,
the character inspires and drives him to assume the existence of the mode of certainty in
order to prove it. The defiant spirit of Melville’s quest manifests itself in Ahab.
The chapter “The Doubloon” shows how Melville allocates one concept of
investigation to one character in the novel in an almost mathematical process. While
Melville’s method of setting up his quest in the construction of his characters can thus be
considered empirical, he does not favor the approach of one character over that of
another. Melville admires Ahab’s zeal as much as he values Starbuck’s integrity and
faith, or Ishmael’s analytic descriptivism. As an author, Melville maintains critical
distance from his characters, yet still wishes to present one possible solution to the issue
of uncertainty: he does not want to commit to one perspective, but having postulated
plurality as one of his modes of analysis, he cannot retreat to the comfort of dogma either.
“The Doubloon” illustrates the author’s dilemma and demonstrates Melville’s
commitment to pluralism as the ultimate solution to uncertainty. Melville tries to create a
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via media—as Newman might say—between the axiom that “truth stands still,” a notion
that had dominated the early years of the nineteenth century, and the state of complete
uncertainty (Hovenkamp 61).
Herman Melville strips the problem of certainty down to a binary decision. To
obtain absolute certainty about the nature of God, one may either quest by any means
necessary, which entails abandoning mankind to transcend society’s emotional and moral
boundaries or one must seek the community of others and adopt a contemplative attitude
towards the divine while indulging in the daily struggles and duties of community life.
This certainty of smaller things, as one may call it, represented by Ishmael
suggests, happiness that is only attainable within boundaries. Through Ishmael and Ahab,
Melville illustrates the fundamental dichotomy between unbound and limited questing.
Ahab is a quester without boundaries; he wants to know an inconceivably large world,
while Ishmael is ultimately satisfied with overcoming the unsociable feeling that compels
him to go whaling. With Ishmael, Melville proposes an attitude of achieving minor goals
that respect and consider the limitations of human perception. However, Ishmael is not a
complacent quester; he merely quests within the boundaries of his human frame, while
Ahab seeks to transcend them. We can see this in Ishmael’s attempt to measure the whale
god, but where certainty is that the priests always interject themselves as mediators
between God and the individual. Melville postulates that certainty can be attained in
small categories, as the character Stubb comically demonstrates in his charting of the
doubloon. Ishmael lives to function as the narrator of this truth, even though he has not
fully understood it; for he still clings to his notions of inactivity and contemplation in his
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narrative. Baker notes in the context of comparing Melville’s text to biblical passages that
Melville “dangles before his reader the possibility of a simple allegorical reading”;
however, Ishmael does not survive because he won a hypothetical contest by using the
supposedly correct method. Rather, Melville uses him as narrator because of Ishmael’s
contemplative character (190). While the outcome of the novel clearly favors Ishmael’s
empiricist approach on the surface, Melville has already demonstrated his commitment to
plurality up to this point in the text. After the destruction of the Pequod, Ishmael remains
as the last man standing to tell the tale. But his tale is not about his encounter with the
White Whale or the things he learned from this experience, but about the hidden meaning
of whaling in general. Ishmael elaborates on the representations of whales and how
whaling is a metaphor for stripping away the secrets of nature to arrive at something
tangible: certainty. Ishmael applies science to measure God, while Ahab rejects all
empirical strategies to find certainty. Ishmael discovers certainty in the community he
forms with Queequeg and the rest of the crew, while Ahab takes the secret of the nature
of the whale’s nature with him to a solitary grave.
Melville’s solution to the dilemma of uncertainty can be considered unresolved at
best, as he provides the options of either accepting one limitations in the search for truth
or to quest eternally and without remorse until death. Again, Melville I believe shows us
a via media, by presenting the process of questing from multiple angles in Moby-Dick.
The consistent pursuit and the search for new methods of questing stand at the center of
his investigation, as Ahab states in the chapter “The Gilder” that,
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“There is no steady unretracing progress in this life [...] through infancy‘s
unconscious spell, boyhood‘s thoughtless faith, adolescence‘s doubt (the common
doom) then scepticism, then disbelief, resting at last in manhood‘s pondering
repose of If.“ (373)
The ideology of perpetual learning is represented by Melville’s narrator, Ishmael, as well
as Melville’s strategy of using charts in various representations. Activity and the
perpetual act of questing are the tools with which the author seeks to combat his inner
urge to ascertain the nature of God with empirical certainty. However, as both characters
Ishmael and Ahab illustrate, Melville walks a thin line between contemplation and
monomania. Nevertheless Melville pursues his various quests to the last. Andrew
Delbanco agrees in Herman Melville: His World and Work (2005) that Melville, while
suffering a decline in his career after Moby-Dick, never gave up being an author, nor did
he fall into “a long silence” (288). Melville’s ideology of activity defied his own spiritual
uncertainty, as well as the physical limitations of his latter life (he was “suffering from
recurrent skin and lung infections”), granting him the will to pursue his quest for
certainty even beyond Moby-Dick (Delbanco 288). I therefore disagree with both
Reynolds and Stein, who postulate that in his writings, Melville either expresses his
disdain for society in an a attack on faith or is a bitter author who has retreated from
society and takes revenge for his commercial failure by adopting a pessimistic mode of
reform in his writing. I believe that Melville performs a constructive task in playing out
his quest for certainty in Moby-Dick. As Robert Sattelmeyer notes, Melville “struggled to
complete” the text, not because of his writer’s block, but because of the inner struggle

105

between the conventions of his profession and his personal “ambitions and creative
daring” to compose a philosophical work rather than a mere adventure story. As my
analysis up to this point has shown, Melville does not merely bathe in melancholy and
subversive metaphors when faced with the spiritual uncertainty of his Age. The fact that
the author is writing Moby-Dick and explores the various approaches to obtaining
certainty symbolizes an attitude of defiance against depression caused by uncertainty
prevalent to the nineteenth century.
In Fifteen Sermons, John Henry Newman claims that “According as objects are
great, the mode of attaining them is extraordinary; [...] Courage does not consist in
calculation, but in fighting against chances“ (219). Melville does not accept the
separation of science and religion that increasingly shaped the mood of his age. Newman
would have indirectly applauded Melville’s attempt to chart a way through the
uncertaintcies of his century. Even if Moby-Dick is “but a draught of a draught” and
might not lead its creator to absolute certainty, the novel still is a chart that points at out a
way out of the dilemma—even if it is only the first step on a long road (Melville 125).
Despite the bitter encounters with nature that he depicts in the plot, Melville ultimately
pursues a constructive end in his quest, not for annihilation but for life in all its faults.
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